What Obama's win means for Lebanon

[Originally posted at NOW Lebanon]

With the announcement Wednesday morning of incumbent Barack Obama’s defeat of Republican challenger Mitt Romney in the US presidential elections, a natural question for many Lebanese is what the consequences, if any, will be for them and their country, and how those might have differed had Romney been the victor.

Though analysts contacted by NOW Lebanon have divergent views on the specific implications of Obama’s win for Lebanon, none believed the outcome would have a direct impact in the short term; any effects that could potentially unfold being indirect and longer-term.

Some argue the result will make next to no difference whatsoever. “I do not think there will be any difference regarding Lebanon,” said Riad Kahwaji, head of the INEGMA think tank. “The US has already been leading from behind when it comes to Lebanon, granting the leading role to France. [French] President Hollande’s visit to Lebanon on Sunday was a clear indication who leads the way in the country from the Western side,” he told NOW.

Elias Muhanna, assistant professor at Brown University and author of the Qifa Nabki blog, largely agrees. “There is no evidence of a substantial difference between Obama and Romney on foreign policy. The third presidential debate demonstrated that on this area, the candidates are very difficult to tell apart. What that means for Lebanon is an extension of the status quo,” he said.

Others, however, argue that a Romney victory would ultimately have been in Lebanon’s better interests. “There are two elements to consider here: the Lebanon policy of a Romney administration and the Syria policy of a Romney administration. Both would have been to the benefit of Lebanon,” said David Schenker, director of the Program on Arab Politics at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

“We don’t have anything on record from Romney about Lebanon, but if we look at the people involved in his campaign, such as Eric Edelman and Elliot Abrams, these were very big supporters of the pro-democracy March 14 movement during the Bush administration,” he told NOW. The Obama administration, on the other hand, “really dropped the ball in 2009 by not having any creative ideas or a vision about how to consolidate the election victory of the pro-West March 14 coalition.”

As for Syria, Schenker argues that Romney’s support for “the arming of the Free Syrian Army to try and end the Assad regime was a real big distinction between the two candidates. It’s been 20 months so far, and I think everybody can acknowledge President Obama’s policy of focusing solely on the hapless Syrian National Council was really a waste of time. By not providing sufficient support to the opposition fighters on the ground, the largely secular opposition has lost ground to jihadists and more militant Islamists. And that is certainly to Lebanon’s detriment, particularly vis-à-vis the future of post-Assad Syria.”

Romney did indeed say during the third presidential debate that the US should “make sure [Syrian opposition fighters] have the arms necessary to defend themselves.” Other analysts, however, are less convinced that he would put these words into action. “[Romney] spoke in strong neoconservative terms while seeking the Republican Party nomination, but has shifted to more centrist, cautious views as he bids for independent and centrist voters in the general election […] on Syria and Iran he has generally endorsed Mr Obama's cautious approach while vaguely suggesting that he would be tougher,” wrote Paul Salem, director of the Beirut-based Carnegie Middle East Center.

Obama’s victory may also allay fears that US funding of the Lebanese Armed Forces—typically amounting to some $100 million per annum—would be reduced under a Romney administration, given the latter’s campaign pledge to reduce foreign aid.

However, Kahwaji believes this question hinges not on the US president but on the Lebanese cabinet itself. “The US funding of Lebanon depends on the cabinet. When March 14 was in power, there was a great deal of spending and military support. After the Hariri cabinet collapsed and a cabinet considered to back by Syria, Iran and Hezbollah was formed, there was a significant reduction in military aid. To this day, US is no longer sending heavy weapons,” he told NOW.

As for Iran itself, analysts were in agreement that a Romney administration would have been more likely to take military action against the Islamic Republic, with the strong possibility of consequent battles between Hezbollah and Israel. That scenario, they believe, is now less probable given Obama’s re-election.

Amani Hamad contributed reporting.

Israel's mysterious wall with Lebanon

[Originally posted at NOW Lebanon]

For the first time in its 64-year history, Israel will build a wall along its northern border with Lebanon, according to recent press releases from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). After a series of tripartite meetings between UNIFIL, the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces, it was announced that a wall will be constructed “to replace the existing Israeli technical fence along the Blue Line near the town of Kfar Kila.” When contacted by NOW Lebanon, UNIFIL spokesman Neeraj Singh declined to give precise details about the wall, but media reports suggest it will be approximately one kilometer in length, five meters high, and equipped with surveillance technology.

NOW Lebanon travelled to Kfar Kila and found no evidence that construction has yet begun. The adjacent Israeli village of Metula, surrounded by Lebanese territory on three sides, continues to be demarcated by the same metal fence that spans the length of the Blue Line, and there was no building equipment to be seen at any point in the vicinity. Moreover, UNIFIL troops stationed at the fence told NOW that they were unaware of any construction activity to date.

Indeed, the larger question appears to be why Israel should build such a wall in the first place. The official reason stated by UNIFIL both in press releases and in conversation with NOW is to “enhance security” and “minimize the scope for sporadic tensions or any misunderstandings that could lead to escalation of the situation” in “this sensitive area.” Former UNIFIL spokesman Timur Goksel agreed, telling NOW that, “This is the weakest point across the fence. It’s very easy to breach this area because it’s in a gully, and therefore not easily observable from Israeli positions.” David Schenker, an expert on Arab-Israeli politics at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, concurred. “This is obviously a pretty sensitive area [for Israel], being so close to Metula. They’re concerned about infiltration. Also, a wall can prevent direct line-of-sight firing of things like RPGs and mortars.”

On a similar note, in the nearby town of Marjayoun, a journalist, who preferred not be named, introduced NOW to some Hezbollah members. “The Israelis are scared,” said one. “They know that if they provoke us again, we will wipe Israel off the map.” Rhetorical bravado though that doubtless was, it may nevertheless be true that the IDF is seeking to avoid deploying troops wherever possible. As Goksel put it, “A wall can cover the area without the need for posting soldiers. From Israel’s point of view it makes sense.”

However, the area has not in fact been a hazardous or “sensitive” one historically. “In my experience [of 24 years], there were never any attacks there because it’s adjacent to a Lebanese village, so any attack there will make life for the Lebanese very difficult,” Goksel said. “I don’t think anybody has ever thought of doing anything there. Moreover, even if you cross [into Israel] there, you’re not going to come across an Israeli position for a long time, so it doesn’t make sense for anyone to attack from there. What are you going to attack? There’s no target.” Similarly, at the fence in Kfar Kila, NOW spoke to UNIFIL troops and a number of local residents, none of whom said they had ever had security problems in the past.

If not security, then what else may be on Israel’s mind? The journalist Harriet Sherwood of the London Guardian wrote last month that Metula locals “speak of a flourishing drug-smuggling trade along this stretch of the border.” Kfar Kila residents denied this, although it isn’t clear in any case how a wall of merely one kilometer would prevent such a trade if it did exist.

Alternatively, the wall may be part of a wider, more general Israeli initiative to bolster its borders. Much has already been written about its 760 kilometer-long wall in the West Bank (which extends beyond its legally-recognized borders). Much more recently, however, Israel has also commenced construction of a 240 kilometer-long barrier on its Egyptian border. Schenker suggests this trend reflects heightened anxieties in Israel about the broader political transformations in the region. “Israel is building a series of walls, the most prominent one along the border with Egypt, because the Sinai has now basically become ungoverned.”

Finally, some are skeptical that the wall will be built at all. “I know the Israeli mentality very well,” said the journalist in Marjayoun, who lived for many years under Israeli occupation. “If they want to do something, they do it. They don’t tell you about it in advance.”

Whether or not he turns out to be correct, Israel’s objective in constructing the wall will remain a mystery for the time being.

Luna Safwan contributed reporting for this article.