Innocent Syrians pay the price for Aounists' bigotry

[Originally posted at NOW]

“I personally made the plan to encircle Tel az-Zaatar and liberate it […] The siege lasted 52 days, I think, and the Palestinians weren’t leaving […] Eventually, it was getting boring and irritating so they removed the camp. There might have been some transgressions […]”

That was General Michel Aoun’s casual description, as recounted to Al Jazeera, of his role in the famous 1976 siege of the Tel az-Zaatar refugee camp, the end result of which, David Hirst writes in Beware of Small States, was some 3,500 Palestinian men, women and children killed; “between 1,000 and 2,000 of them after the camp had fallen, crushed under bulldozers, shot and hacked to death, or finished off by militiamen.”

It’s the kind of anecdote that casts a perpetually ironic shadow over Aoun’s 2006 Memorandum of Understanding with Hezbollah, and is always worth recalling when you hear the MoU described as some kind of enlightened breakthrough for communal harmony – a “remarkable” example of “Christian[s] and Muslims working together for a united Lebanon,” as a hopelessly hoodwinked Terry Waite put it not long ago.

Indeed, while it’s by no means straightforward to identify Lebanon’s most sectarian Christian party – recall that the dreadful Orthodox Gathering electoral law proposal had enthusiastic, bipartisan Christian support – the Aounists have certainly contended harder than most for the title in recent years (as even the likes of Asaad AbuKhalil are beginning to notice).

As if to seal the deal, on Sunday former telecoms minister Nicolas Sehnaoui and his comrade Ziad Abs – both of whom are often touted even by March 14ers as exemplifying the polished, respectable face of the Free Patriotic Movement – took to the mic to declare the era of playing nice with the Syrian refugees over for good.

Picking up where their colleague, the new Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil last left off (“Syrians already in Lebanon should be deported […] What is happening [is a plot] to change the demography of the country”), Sehnaoui and Abs explained that the refugees’ already-alarming designs on Lebanon had overstepped the final frontier of tolerability. From the “barracks” of their sodden tents, the job-stealing, gun-toting invaders have at last arrived, with their veiled wives and daughters, to – quelle horreur! – the doorsteps of Ashrafieh itself. His proposed solution, reports as-Safir, involves sealing the border, enforcing an 8pm curfew for all Syrians in the area, and creating a nightly security patrol force, “especially in the places Syrians gather."

It’s obviously pointless to note that no evidence exists linking the refugee influx with higher crime, or that the only major act of violence to have occurred in Ashrafieh since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis was the car bombing of the March 14 ally, Wissam al-Hassan – a brazen murder of a senior policemen for which Sehnaoui held no indignant press conference at the time.

Indeed, the tragic thing about this kind of crude incitement is it really works with the constituents (don’t be surprised if, feeling the squeeze, a March 14 Christian tries to one-up Sehnaoui’s act next weekend). But it ought to go without saying it’s also abhorrently inhumane. It isn’t just that sealing the border would be, as rights groups are often forced to repeat, a violation of international law. Innocent Syrians in Lebanon have already suffered far too many unprovoked physical assaults, fuelled by precisely the bigotry and misinformation peddled by Sehnaoui and Abs on Sunday. (Recall, for example, the torching of a camp in December after false allegations of rape, or the secret beatings in October 2012 of Syrian labourers by the army in Ashrafieh itself, as I witnessed with my own eyes while crouching next to NOW’s Raphael Thelen, who first broke the story.) It’s only a matter of time before more xenophobic violence occurs, and when it does, Sehnaoui and his friends will bear a part of the responsibility.

Lebanon's new bombs: Killing fewer, but more frequently

[Originally posted at NOW]

Today’s suicide attack in Choueifat, south of Beirut, is the 14th vehicle bombing to have hit Lebanon since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis, and the 5th to have occurred in 2014 alone. I only know this because, since the November 2013 double suicide bombing of the Iranian embassy, I’ve felt the need to maintain a database recording the details of each attack; thinking it was an unhealthy sign when one started to lose track of the number of murderous explosions taking place in one’s own country of residence.

A more comprehensive analysis of these data, complete with interactive graphics, will be published by NOW in the coming days, but in the meantime, the following observations may be among the most salient:

• While earlier car bombs tended to be infrequent, but massively destructive spectacles (e.g. the 15 August 2013 Ruwais bomb, killing 27, and the twin Tripoli mosque bombs 8 days later, which killed 45); the last seven have occurred with much higher frequency, but with lower death tolls (all claimed fewer than 10 lives)
• Seven of the fourteen (50%) have occurred in Beirut and its southern suburbs, with the remainder taking place in Tripoli, the south, and the Beqaa Valley.
• Jabhat al-Nusra in Lebanon is the only group to have claimed more than one attack (it’s claimed three so far). The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, the Abdallah Azzam Brigades, the Aisha Mother of the Believers Brigade, and the 313 Special Forces Brigade have each claimed one. Seven attacks have not been claimed by anyone.
• Two of the bombings have been assassinations (of police intelligence chief Wissam al-Hassan in October 2012 and former ambassador and minister Mohamad Chatah in December 2013).
• The 14 bombings have killed a total of at least 122, with a number of wounded still hospitalized in critical condition.

Look out for much more detail in NOW’s upcoming interactive report.

What is March 14's new "civil resistance"?

[Originally posted at NOW]

Coalition launches new campaign to “liberate” Lebanon from Hezbollah’s arms, but some supporters remain skeptical.

At the funeral of slain former ambassador and March 14 minister Mohamad Chatah in Downtown Beirut on 29 December, a leader of the anti-Damascus bloc and former close colleague of Chatah’s declared the birth of a new chapter in the coalition’s nine-year-long campaign to rid the country of Syrian influence.

“We have decided to embrace civil resistance,” said Future parliamentary bloc leader and former prime minister MP Fouad Siniora. “O martyr Mohamad Chatah, [Lebanon] after your assassination will not be the same as before it.”

The phrase “civil resistance” – a jab at March 14’s arch-rival, Hezbollah, which styles itself on its flag as “the Islamic resistance” – has since become the official name of the coalition’s new campaign, which will seek to combine grassroots activism, measures at the domestic parliamentary level, and lobbying of the international community to “liberate” the country, in Siniora’s words, from “illegitimate arms.”

“It is a non-traditional way to say no to the illegal arms in Lebanon,” said Fares Soueid, head of the March 14 General Secretariat. “We tried all the traditional channels between 2005 and 2012: the dialogue table; the national coalition government; the Doha Agreement. After our failure to reach any agreement or compromise with Hezbollah concerning the building of the state […] we are shifting to civil resistance,” he told NOW.

What this will mean in terms of specific policy measures and actions is yet to be finalized. The only step confirmed by Soueid to NOW was a total suspension of ties with Hezbollah, the party-cum-militia implicitly blamed by Future Movement leader MP Saad Hariri for the assassination of Chatah on 27 December.

“We are not going to make the same mistake as the European Union, of dividing Hezbollah into a political and military branch. For us, there is only one Hezbollah, which works in politics with a gun in its hands.”

Beyond this, another likely component, according to Soueid, will be an effort to leverage March 14’s international relationships in order to pass a new UN Security Council resolution to “assure the neutrality of Lebanon” with respect to ongoing turmoil in the region – particularly the Syrian conflict, in which Hezbollah is a significant paramilitary participant, and to which Chatah’s assassination has been linked by various analysts.

The coalition may also decide to once again boycott parliament, said Soueid, as they did for several months following the October 2012 assassination of police intelligence chief Wissam al-Hassan. Mass street demonstrations might also be organized. “These are all [options] in our hands,” Soueid told NOW.

Asked how long the campaign would last, Soueid implied it was open-ended.

“We are talking about civil resistance. It’s not like a medical prescription, it’s a process. So we are going to begin slowly, but surely, and we are going to win.”

The launch of the campaign has been met with mixed reactions from March 14 activists at the grassroots level. Some are enthusiastic, spreading the word on social media – dedicated Facebook and Twitter pages have been created – and even spray-painting graffiti in support.

“There’s always more that can be done, but actually this time, we are doing our maximum,” said Karim Rifai, a March 14 activist prominent on the ground. “We consider that we are mobilizing people for the last sprint,” he told NOW.

“It’s the only way out of what we’re in,” said Walid Fakhreddine, head of the March 14-aligned Democratic Left Movement. “It’s a serious campaign, and more is yet to come, but nothing is going to be made public beforehand. In the upcoming two or three days, there will be announcements of further actions.”

Others, however, took a less hopeful view, questioning the campaign’s strategic clarity and the coalition’s commitment to seeing it through to fruition.

“Until now, I don’t think they were able to translate ‘civil resistance’ into anything tangible,” said Sara Assaf, another longtime grassroots March 14 activist. “I think the problem is it’s just a slogan that was launched, and then as usual they will not really translate it into any efficient action on the ground.”

Moreover, Assaf queried the sincerity of the campaign, in light of recent reports that March 14 is contemplating forming a new cabinet in partnership with Hezbollah after all.

“You cannot come and launch a slogan like ‘civil resistance’ and say you took a major decision to ‘liberate Lebanon from the occupation of illegitimate weapons,’ as Siniora said, and then days later start bargaining on a government with Hezbollah. It doesn’t make sense […] This would be covering Hezbollah in its sectarian war in Syria, at a time when the Special Tribunal for Lebanon [trial] is due to start,” Assaf added.

“The contradiction here is huge and it’s very disappointing for people like me and many others in the March 14 public.”

Other still are doubtful that the “liberation” envisaged by Siniora is possible at all, in the face of powerful international obstacles.

“The title is big, and it’s a very nice title, but so far it’s just that,” said Mustafa Fahs, a political analyst sympathetic to March 14’s broader goals. “Circumstances today are very difficult, and go way beyond this title.”

“There is a regional conflict today, and we in Lebanon are merely tiny details in it.”

What's next for March 14?

[Originally posted at NOW Lebanon]

Wednesday’s postponement until January of a national dialogue session scheduled for Thursday demonstrated the continuing failure to break the political deadlock into which the country plunged after October’s dramatic assassination of intelligence chief Wissam al-Hassan.

In the days following Hassan’s killing, which groups including the March 14 coalition and Walid Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) blamed on Syria, March 14 announced a complete boycott of all government and parliamentary activity until the current cabinet, led by Prime Minister Najib Miqati, was dissolved.

One month later, however, the cabinet remains intact and even appears to have a degree of support from March 14’s international allies, including the United States and the European Union, who have expressed fears of a power vacuum.

Accordingly, March 14’s boycott tactic has faced criticism even from those sympathetic to its broader vision. A leading independent politician with close ties to March 14 told NOW Lebanon that he preferred not to comment on the boycott, “because I would be forced to criticize it, and now is not the time to do that.”

Recently, both President Michel Suleiman and the PSP have been trying to coax March 14 back into all-party talks.

How exactly March 14 could be induced to embrace dialogue, however, is unclear. One option, proposed by former MP Mosbah al-Ahdab of the independent Tajaddod Movement, is for the coalition to launch a separate initiative on its own terms. “A solution would be for them to set the points that should be taken into consideration and agreed by the other side in order to launch a new dialogue,” he told NOW. “We’re back to square zero, we need to start all over again, and I think they should be setting a priority list, or let’s say starting points, for a new discussion.”

However, Dr Imad Salameh, political science professor at the Lebanese American University, believes nothing short of the cabinet’s collapse will bring March 14 to a dialogue table. “March 14 has no way out other than confronting the current government,” he told NOW. “For years, March 14 has been trapped over and over into senseless dialogue in which it always ends up making concessions. That’s why the resignation of this government is a pre-requisite for further dialogue.”

Certainly that was the view of March 14 partisans interviewed by NOW at the sit-in opposite Beirut’s Grand Serail on Tuesday evening. Since October 20 – the day after Hassan’s assassination – around half a dozen tents have been erected outside the Prime Minister’s office, and the activists who have spent their days and nights there told NOW they aren’t budging.

“The only compromise we will accept is that the government goes. Nothing less,” said Jihad Naamani of the Future Movement. When asked if he felt the sit-in was achieving its goals, Naamani said, “Yes, just by keeping our camp alive and having lots of people coming down every night for meetings and seminars, we are accomplishing our part of the goal.” While admitting that the government had succeeded in fending off March 14’s demands thus far, Naamani asserted that the cabinet would fall “within two or three months” at the most.

Contra Ahdab, Salameh argues the onus is in fact on March 8, not March 14, to break the deadlock. “The way out is not March 14’s responsibility as far as I’m concerned, it’s the responsibility of the current government and those who control it, particularly Hezbollah. If [the latter] want to yield a fair share of power and control of security apparatuses, which seem to have totally slipped into the hands of [March 8], then March 14 will have reason to negotiate.”

PSP secretary-general Zafer Nasser, however, questions how such an agreement could be reached without March 14 agreeing to talk in the first place. “One cannot offer anything to them if they don’t participate in dialogue,” he told NOW. “One has to sit with them and talk so they offer something and the other party offers something. You cannot tell them, ‘Here you go, this is a settlement’ and then ask them to attend dialogue. They would say, ‘Why attend dialogue if a settlement has already been reached?’”

To this, Salameh retorts that March 8 shares the blame for the lack of talks. “The media says [that March 14 is the one blocking dialogue], but in actuality one should ask what are the issues being discussed? Are we going to negotiate whether Hezbollah’s arms will become subject to government control? Are we going to negotiate a new government? Are we going to negotiate the restructuring of the security apparatuses?” Without these items on the table, says Salameh, dialogue “will only lead to additional concessions on March 14’s behalf and will strengthen the position of the government and Hezbollah.”

Amani Hamad contributed reporting.

Interview with Walid Jumblatt

[Originally posted at NOW Lebanon]

As we shuffled into a lavish sitting room in his Ottoman-era mansion in Moukhtara first thing Tuesday morning, Walid Jumblatt’s day job was already underway. We joined what soon became a line of people waiting, for whatever purpose—requesting tuition fees for children, resolving a dispute with the neighbors in Clemenceau—to meet the Druze chieftain. When he entered, his tall, lanky frame stooped as he walked, his facial expression half-annoyed and half-amused, as though incredulous at having to deal with such banality.

After speedily acceding to a few requests, he ushered us into another sitting room, adorned with (among other things) a floor-to-ceiling portrait of slain Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. In general, walking through the house feels like touring Istanbul’s Dolmabahçe Palace. “But I don’t have the Bosphorus outside,” he replied when NOW Lebanon remarked this. “It’s a beautiful city. The only other city as beautiful, until they destroyed it, was Aleppo.”

Such was the tone for much of our conversation with the enigmatic Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) leader. His reputed political acumen—along with his less-flattering notoriety for abruptly switching allegiances—have earned him the nickname “the weathervane”; a man “whose every premonitory move [is] dissected by those trying to get a sense of Lebanon’s political winds,” as Michael Young once put it. If that is so, then there appears to be an uncertain breeze in Moukhtara today. For though he tells NOW that he is “not March 8,” those in the March 14 coalition hoping for Jumblatt jumping ship once again to their side may well be in for disappointment.

There were reports over the weekend that the PSP is planning an initiative to ease internal strife and promote dialogue. Why did you decide to do this?

Jumblatt: We have an initiative parallel to the efforts of the President Suleiman who is calling for dialogue. We just want to help President Suleiman. At the same time we have consulted with Prime Minister Miqati and [Parliament Speaker] Nabih Berri. We have to find a way to get out of this blockade where nobody is speaking with anybody, and the only way to reach that is launching an initiative. I hope it will succeed, I don’t know. I have charged my comrades in the party to go and visit all the political parties and actors possible, starting tomorrow, from March 14 to March 8 to independents.

Why did you not join March 14’s recent boycott of the cabinet?

Jumblatt: Why should I join them? I’m not March 14!

But you openly blamed Syria for the assassination of Wissam al-Hassan.

Jumblatt: Yes, and they are blaming Miqati. Miqati did not kill Wissam al-Hassan. I’m sorry, I refuse categorically all the accusations of March 14 against Miqati.

The day after Hassan’s death, we saw PSP flags at the March 14 Youth rally.

Jumblatt: They have removed those flags. This is a small trap fixed by some idiots. We are not March 14. And I’m not March 8. I’m just in this coalition trying to fix up things as much as I can, taking into account the environment which is terribly sectarian, and some people don’t care, it seems. They’re just attacking here and there; they don’t care about the possible sectarian strife that could engulf Lebanon.

Which people are you referring to?

Jumblatt: Some high-ranking leaders. Because in this country everyone is becoming high-ranking, nobody is low-ranking.

What do you think of the Ahmad al-Assir movement?

Jumblatt: When the moderate Future Movement is absent, any vacuum is filled, so this is why Sheikh Saad [Hariri] should come back and lead what his father did: the moderate Sunni trend.

How are your relations with Hariri?

Jumblatt: We are friends on personal terms but we differ on political issues. We speak occasionally.

Regarding Hassan’s assassination, do you think any Lebanese parties were also involved?

Jumblatt: I just accused the Syrian intelligence. Of course they have partners and agents here. But I’m not going to accuse a political party, like others did, because they don’t care if there is sectarian strife. And I was very clear, just as with the murder of Rafiq al-Hariri, that if Hezbollah has enough evidence that Hariri was killed by the Israelis, as Sayyed Hassan claimed at one point, then let him present this evidence to the international tribunal. I’m not going to accuse any party because my concern is that civil strife must stop.

So even if you have suspicions, you’re not going to voice them so as to maintain stability?

Jumblatt: I do not have suspicions. I am not a lawyer or a prosecutor. You have an international tribunal where people can go and present evidence.

If you believe the Syrian regime is killing senior Lebanese officials, then why do you support the “dissociation” policy? Shouldn’t Syria be considered an enemy state, like Israel?

Jumblatt: Syria being an enemy state? Not at all, I’m sorry. This is a monstrosity. We are accusing the regime, but Syria is Syria, Syria is our background, Syria helped us during the civil war, it fixed the balance inside Lebanon, it helped create the Taif Agreement, it supported the resistance. We have to distinguish between the regime and the people. And the army, which fought very bravely against Israelis during the 1982 invasion.

So the regime itself should not be considered an enemy?

Jumblatt: OK, if it is, then what? Tell me what can we do? This is the nineteenth month of the Syrian revolt and the whole international community is just doing nothing. They are watching Syria being systematically destroyed. It seems the “Friends of Syria” don’t care about Syria.

How can the Syrian conflict be ended?

Jumblatt: Well, if you have a solution, tell me. Just after the battle of Baba Amr, I called everybody in the West that I know—the British, the French—to help the rebels to get adequate weapons to shoot down helicopters. They said, “We can’t do it because it will end up in civil war.” And at that time, the civil war began.

How do you feel about the Druze in Syria?

Jumblatt: I’m concerned about Syria. The Druze are Syrian people. I don’t look at the sectarian aspect.

If there is no intervention in Syria, what happens?

Jumblatt: Nobody asked for intervention in Syria; just helping the Syrian rebels. Now it’s chaotic, because everybody is intervening in his own way, from the Arab world and from individuals, and now we have the situation whereby yesterday in Aleppo some so-called free brigades announced they don’t want to be part of the Doha Agreement, they have announced the “Islamic Emirates” in Aleppo. This is the disorganized help of the Arab and Western world because everybody is sponsoring somebody else. And what’s the result? Total chaos.

Do you worry about a Sunni-Shiite war in Lebanon?

Jumblatt: When I say sectarian strife I’m speaking about some Sunnis and some Shiites. This cannot be solved except by sitting at a table and talking to each other. That’s it. And if some in March 14 still insist that the weapons of Hezbollah can be delivered at any price? No. The weapons are a very sensitive issue, and these weapons should be part of the defensive strategy that is being elaborated by President Suleiman. One day these weapons could be part of the Lebanese army, but that cannot be at the push of a button, we have to wait. I mean it took the Irish 20 years to decommission the weapons between Protestants and Catholics. Now here it’s a much more difficult issue.

You said recently that it will take a new Taif Agreement to resolve Hezbollah’s weapons. What did you mean by that?

Jumblatt: I was assaulted, directly by everybody, by all the excited people of March 14. I did not say that. Even if I said that, it was a slip of the tongue. [Laughs]

In that case, how do you advocate resolving the issue?

Jumblatt: You have to adequately address the Shiite community. You have to speak to them. But at the same time, some have committed a big error, because they have been ordered, by the Iranians, I don’t know, to go and fight inside Syria for the regime. But this is not their policy, this is the policy of Iran. I hope that one day the Iranians will change and address the Syrian people and not the regime, because they are losing a lot of support for their stance. At the same time, some parties of March 14 also are arming the rebels, so the policy of [dissociation] should be addressed to both parties; to Hezbollah and March 14.

Regarding elections, is there an electoral law you favor?

Jumblatt: I’ve not been consulted by anybody. I just hear rumors that some high-ranking people want 50 districts, and others want proportional representation. I have not been consulted. I am ready to discuss to see. Because some people have already started fixing their Armani dresses to become president.

Do you feel the law needs to be changed?

Jumblatt: Of course, one day we have to fix up a modern law, but to do that you have to fix up a modern Lebanon, and to fix up a modern Lebanon, my father spent 19 years trying to do it, and he failed to deconfessionalize the system. I mean we are not even able to fix the civil marriage issue, which is stupid. We oblige the young Lebanese people to go to Cyprus, to Istanbul, to Paris, but here we don’t allow it because the clerics, Muslim and Christian, are against it. They have privileges; they get money to separate the people.

Going back to elections, if we assume the 2009 law is used again, you will likely win in Shouf and Aley, so the question on many minds is whether you will align with March 8 or 14?

Jumblatt: I will align with myself for the time being. I stick to my own belief that we have to fix up a kind of middle ground to avoid this terrible division between 14 and 8.

Do you foresee any changes in Christian districts?

Jumblatt: I have no idea, I don’t work on statistics. They work, they are obsessed with statistics. Michel Aoun and Samir Geagea are obsessed, I really don’t care. My concern is how to deal peacefully with each other.

After Hassan’s assassination, do you fear assassination yourself?

Jumblatt: I have never spoken about myself, like others, who like to speak about themselves, and to have bodyguards and huge convoys. Like my father, I have relied on destiny. I am here just because I like it.

So you’re not more or less afraid than before?

Jumblatt: I was never afraid. When you get afraid like others you get paralyzed mentally.

Do you think the Gaza conflict might affect Lebanon?

Jumblatt: No, Gaza just proved once again that the arrogance of Israelis can just be destroyed, [like] when the Israelis invaded Beirut in 1982. This myth of Israeli superiority is again buried by the rockets of Hamas, by the people of Lebanon, seven times. So it’s a myth, but what can we do, this state is based on a big fallacy supported by the West. One day, the West will discover that the huge amount of money they spend on Israel is just a catastrophe. Because only a peaceful solution based on two states can—maybe—reach some stability. I think maybe it’s too late, because now with the settlers there’s no space for two states.

So you prefer a one-state solution?

Jumblatt: Well this was an intellectual approach by people like Edward Said, but consider now the right-wing tendency of most Israeli society and the absence of the peace movement, except one wise guy, he’s a friend of mine and we correspond with each other, Uri Avnery, and I always read his articles and send comments. Amos Oz too, and Amira Hass, she’s excellent. But the peace movement which demonstrated in Tel Aviv after Sabra and Shatila and caused Sharon’s downfall is no more.

You wrote this week that Gaza could lead to a “new status quo.” What did you mean?

Jumblatt: After the 1973 war came the Camp David agreement, which separated Egypt from the Arabs. But now Gaza is fixing up a new formula. The inner land of Egypt is Gaza, and the Egyptians are always concerned about the fate of Palestine. So Gaza is defying the old order. Same thing in Golan, one day the ceasefire agreement of 1973 will be changed by [whoever] comes in control of the Golan Heights. Lebanon will also have a new status quo [once] we get back the occupied territories of Shebaa. Israel is no more safe from its surroundings. Later on, I hope that King Abdullah will fix up reforms. But the surroundings of Israel have changed. Fortunately that’s good.

Are you worried about the rise of Islamists across the region?

Jumblatt: No, not at all. We cannot change the Arab world. Do you want somebody to convert them? To what? We have to take into account the rise of Islam, be it Shiite or Sunni, and try to see the future and develop, not only culturally but economically. We have so much wealth in this Arab world spent stupidly on buying weapons or treasury bonds. We can have our own development in all the Arab world.

This interview has been condensed and edited.

Justin Salhani contributed questioning.

Will the Sassine bomb sway the Christian vote?

[Originally posted at NOW Lebanon]

When a car bomb laden with over 60 kilograms of TNT gutted the sleepy residential impasse of Ibrahim al-Munzer St. on October 19, it did not merely kill an intelligence chief, his driver and a luckless bystander. Situated scarcely a hundred meters from the bustling Sassine Square—where dozens of glass panes were instantaneously shattered—the blast also drove chaos and terror into the symbolic heart of Beirut’s Christian community.

Seated on the crown of the Ashrafieh hill and orbited by offices, cafés, schools, churches and a mall, Sassine Square is the social and commercial hub of the district. In terms of political orientation, while a large monument to slain President-elect Bashir Gemayel of the Lebanese Forces (now the leading March 14 Christian party) stands in the Square’s center, it is also often adorned with flags of the rival March 8-aligned Free Patriotic Movement (FPM). Indeed, in the most recent parliamentary elections of 2009, March 14 pipped March 8 to victory in Ashrafieh by fewer than 3,000 votes out of a total of 91,000 registered voters.

Such close competition raises the question of what, if any, will be the effects of the bomb on Christian voters in next year’s elections. Assuming the electoral law used closely resembles the 2009 law, as analysts expect it will, then Ashrafieh (technically called “Beirut I”) will once again be a key “swing” district, one of a handful upon which the entire outcome hinges. That the other “swing” districts—chiefly Metn, Zahle and Koura—are also predominantly Christian underscores the paramount importance of Christian voting in determining the overall winner.

For some analysts, the clear loser in this regard following the bomb is March 8. “It is definitely going to realign voting practices among the Christian community, especially concerning [FPM leader Michel] Aoun,” said Charles Chartouni, professor of politics at Université Saint Joseph and the Lebanese University. “I’m not saying voters will necessarily go toward March 14 candidates, but Aoun will definitely lose some voters,” he told NOW Lebanon.

This, Chartouni believes, is due to a perception among Christians that the blast was orchestrated by Aoun’s major allies. “I’ve spoken to a lot of people in Ashrafieh lately, and they are in no doubt that a kind of joint venture between Hezbollah and Syria is behind the assassination. What has hurt people most is that the criminals responsible didn’t care about the fact that these people are living in dense areas and thus the damage can be devastating. If intelligence services want to fight among each other, in a country like ours and in a situation like ours, it’s somewhat understandable, but to forget about civilians and the welfare of people in the neighborhood is considered insulting and disrespectful.”

Key March 14 Christians such as LF leader Samir Geagea and Kataeb chief Amin Gemayel have indeed explicitly accused Hezbollah and Syria of carrying out the bombing. Aoun, on the other hand, has declined to make any accusations, saying,“I will wait for the result of the investigation.”

However, a perusal of the Orange Room, an FPM-affiliated online forum, suggests Aoun’s supporters believe March 14’s reaction to the bomb will in fact work in March 8’s favor. “[March 14] shot themselves in the foot,” said one user in reference to the clashes between March 14 partisans and security forces following the October 21 funeral of the bomb’s target, Internal Security Forces Information Branch head Wissam al-Hassan. “[March 14] Christians are [going to] lose a lot of support,” agreed another. “Islamic flags in [Ashrafieh and Free Syrian Army] flags over [Martyrs Square] is [sic] a big no-no.”

In a similar vein, FPM-aligned Metn MP Ghassan Moukheiber compared the funeral scrap and the subsequent violence in Tripoli and Tariq al-Jdeideh to Hezbollah’s “black shirts” demonstration in 2011. “Storming the Serail and the presence of armed men the day after added ‘black shirts’ of a certain political party confronting ‘black shirts’ of another party. Therefore, there is an equality in the rhetoric of ‘black shirts’,” he told NOW.

However, Antoine Haddad, leader of the March 14-aligned Tajaddod Movement, rejects this equivalence. “The attack on the Serail was a spontaneous one. I’m not reducing its importance here, but it’s not on par with the assassination itself, and it will not have an effect on elections, whereas the link between the assassination and the [Michel] Samaha case will,” he told NOW, referring to the senior Damascus ally who pleaded guilty in August to plotting terror attacks in Lebanon in coordination with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Many Lebanese have speculated that Hassan’s assassination was revenge by Syria for the intelligence chief ordering Samaha’s arrest.

As regards the Islamic flags mentioned on the Orange Room, Chartouni isn’t convinced these will cost March 14. “There is no doubt that Christians are very apprehensive about Islamic militancy. But at the same time this won’t outweigh the fact that assassinations have been committed for seven years now, mostly in Christian areas, in which the victims were always on one side of the divide [i.e. March 14]. And the involvement of Michel Samaha has further confirmed the connection with a Syria-Hezbollah joint venture.”

Of course, this may all prove academic, given that no electoral law has yet been approved for 2013. With tensions already high and the war in neighboring Syria showing little sign of abating, much can change in the next few months. As Haddad put it, “there is a long time yet before the elections.”

Agnes Helou and Amani Hamad contributed reporting.

White March

[Originally posted at NOW Lebanon]

My Lebanese friends were in foul moods when I found them at the demonstration in Martyrs Square last Saturday, the first one to take place in the iconic space after Friday’s horror. In the hours immediately following the blast, amid the fright and anguish unleashed, it seemed there was also another, different energy in the air; a sort of quietly rousing exhilaration, as though a moment might have arrived great enough to wake the country out of a dangerous slumber. (It’s interesting to consider the etymological link between the Arabic infijar, “explosion”, and fijr, “dawn”.)

Those hopes had evidently vanished by the following evening, when I found my friends – proud veterans of the 2005 Cedar Revolution – standing on the fringes of the March 14 protest with weary faces. “It’s all party flags,” shouted one into my ear over the crowd’s exuberant chants of za’eem [chieftain] surnames. When I failed to find him and the others half an hour later, I realized they had all gone home.

It must be something similar to this disappointment that has led twenty young activists to organize tonight’s so-called White March from Martyrs Square to Sassine Square in memory of the victims of the bomb and all subsequent violence throughout the country. In the event’s Facebook description, they make a point of rejecting the sectarianism and partisanship of Saturday’s demonstration, asking attendees to wear white and dispense with party flags or slogans:

“We will walk silent to respect the souls of the dead. We will walk silent to say loudly that all the voices we have been hearing in the streets and via the media recently strengthen our will to work for realistic alternatives and means to do politics beyond confessional belongings, seeking justice and social solidarity.”

Sounds pretty reasonable to me. Join us there tonight at 6pm.

No hope until Assad falls

[Originally posted at NOW Lebanon]

The presence of "Free Syria" flags at Wissam al-Hassan's funeral on Sunday was no coincidence (AP)

On the streets of Tariq Jadideh Monday, only one flag challenged the prominence of the Future Movement’s blue-and-white sunrise emblem: the green, white, black and red stars and stripes of “Free Syria”. The intermittent gun battles that resumed here and, more violently, in Tripoli over the weekend are often described as “sectarian”. They are sectarian – “We are Sunnis and they are Alawites […] Yes, it’s all sectarian,” was how a Tripoli fighter put it to NOW’s Ana Maria Luca in August – but, as the flags illustrate, inseparable from and intrinsic to this religious battle is the political one underway in Syria.

This is true not just figuratively but literally. Having cut their teeth fighting the Alawites of Jabal Mohsen, some Sunnis in Tripoli have graduated to taking on Bashar al-Assad’s forces alongside the Free Syria Army in Homs and Qusayr. To call this “spillover” is to miss the point that the two battles are one and the same for them – not least because they’re firmly convinced that Jabal Mohsen’s militants (along with Hezbollah’s) are also in Syria, fighting for the other side.

The Lebanese army has done a good job of quelling the bloodshed for the moment, but there is no hope of a lasting truce as long as the Syrian war is in stalemate. Lebanon’s pro- and anti-Assad militiamen kill each other because they both truly believe history is on their side. Why make peace when you know you’re going to win?

One of two things has to happen, then, before any kind of negotiation or deal between the factions becomes thinkable: the Free Syria Army surrenders or is utterly exterminated; or the Assad regime is defeated. The first is all but impossible. If Lebanon’s leaders wish to stave off the second with the (incidentally failed) policy of “dissociation”, that’s their prerogative, but we might at least stop saying that delaying the inevitable is a safeguard of “stability”. Friday’s tragedy, if nothing else, should have taught us that much.