I spoke to Monocle 24 radio earlier today about the suicide bombing in Hermel (since claimed by Jabhat al-Nusra) and the opening of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon trial. Episode available here (I come on at 18:34).
Thursday, January 16, 2014
A SCAF coup in Gaza?
[Originally posted at NOW]
According to a Reuters exclusive published today, the military dictatorship which ousted the former Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi last July and subsequently drove his Muslim Brotherhood support base underground – jailing journalists and extinguishing over a thousand civilian lives in the process – hopes now to engineer a repeat of the experience in the Gaza Strip.
“Gaza is next,” an anonymous senior security official told the news agency. “We cannot get liberated from the terrorism of the Brotherhood in Egypt without ending it in Gaza.”
The plan, according to various officials cited in the report, is to use opponents – both militant and civilian – of the Brotherhood-affiliated Hamas government in Gaza to ignite a “first spark” of protests, modeled on the ‘Tamarrod’ [‘Rebel’] movement that opposed Morsi in Cairo last summer, in order to provoke a violent crackdown that would ultimately lead to Hamas’ downfall. “Surely, the world will not stand still and allow Hamas to kill Palestinians. Someone will interfere,” as one source explained it.
To that end, a protest has been scheduled in Gaza for 21 March. Of course, how many people will actually show up is anyone’s guess – a previous attempt, last November, to stage a Tamarrod-branded demonstration in the Strip flopped entirely. It’s difficult to see how much influence the Egyptian generals can actually exert through Hamas’ domestic opponents, almost all of whom are either in jail or have been tortured and intimidated into silence.
Indeed the entire scheme seems basically ludicrous, and not just logistically. There’s no doubt the Hamas regime is a brutal theocracy; a coupling of the fundamentalism of Saudi Arabia with the iron fist of Saddam Hussein. And yet, the Egyptian experience of the past six months leaves rather a lot of room to doubt whether the putsch envisaged by Sisi’s gangsters offers the liberal and democratic alternative Gazans hope for.
According to a Reuters exclusive published today, the military dictatorship which ousted the former Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi last July and subsequently drove his Muslim Brotherhood support base underground – jailing journalists and extinguishing over a thousand civilian lives in the process – hopes now to engineer a repeat of the experience in the Gaza Strip.
“Gaza is next,” an anonymous senior security official told the news agency. “We cannot get liberated from the terrorism of the Brotherhood in Egypt without ending it in Gaza.”
The plan, according to various officials cited in the report, is to use opponents – both militant and civilian – of the Brotherhood-affiliated Hamas government in Gaza to ignite a “first spark” of protests, modeled on the ‘Tamarrod’ [‘Rebel’] movement that opposed Morsi in Cairo last summer, in order to provoke a violent crackdown that would ultimately lead to Hamas’ downfall. “Surely, the world will not stand still and allow Hamas to kill Palestinians. Someone will interfere,” as one source explained it.
To that end, a protest has been scheduled in Gaza for 21 March. Of course, how many people will actually show up is anyone’s guess – a previous attempt, last November, to stage a Tamarrod-branded demonstration in the Strip flopped entirely. It’s difficult to see how much influence the Egyptian generals can actually exert through Hamas’ domestic opponents, almost all of whom are either in jail or have been tortured and intimidated into silence.
Indeed the entire scheme seems basically ludicrous, and not just logistically. There’s no doubt the Hamas regime is a brutal theocracy; a coupling of the fundamentalism of Saudi Arabia with the iron fist of Saddam Hussein. And yet, the Egyptian experience of the past six months leaves rather a lot of room to doubt whether the putsch envisaged by Sisi’s gangsters offers the liberal and democratic alternative Gazans hope for.
Sharon death only partial solace for Shatila survivors
[Originally posted at NOW, with Luna Safwan]
NOW speaks with Palestinian survivors of the infamous 1982 massacre.
SHATILA, Lebanon: On Monday afternoon, only a few hundred kilometers away from Beirut, the recently-deceased former Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, was being laid to final rest in the Negev desert, where he was eulogized by national and international dignitaries as a “great leader” whose “memory will forever be kept in the nation’s heart.”
But in the mud-caked, bare-brick labyrinth of narrow alleyways in Beirut’s Shatila refugee camp, some streets scarcely wide enough for one adult to pass, Sharon’s name was remembered by the Palestinian residents for something other than greatness.
“I was 12 years old at the time. I remember standing right here,” said one resident who gave his name only as Fadi, pointing to the rusted metal doorway of his apartment on one of the camp’s numberless streets. “It was nighttime, and there were lights flying high up in the air. And I was wondering, who’s making these lights? And why?”
It was September, 1982. The answer to Fadi’s question, we now know, is that the lights were flares, fired by Israeli troops who had occupied the city weeks earlier following a bloody ground and air assault campaign masterminded by then-Defense Minister Sharon. The flares provided illumination for Lebanese militiamen, allied with Israel at the time, who entered the camp and committed perhaps the most infamous massacre of the 15-year civil war, in which over a thousand civilian men, women, and children were killed with the knowledge of the Israeli forces encircling the camp. Many of the victims were raped and hacked with blades. An official Israeli inquiry later found Sharon “indirectly responsible” for the massacre and recommended that he be removed from his post. To his critics, he would forever be known as the “Butcher of Beirut” thenceforth.
On top of the wardrobe in his bedroom, 83-year-old Hajj Abu Ahmad al-Salhani still keeps a remarkable memento of the slaughter that nearly claimed his life. “This is one of the actual weapons they used on us,” he tells NOW, holding up an old workman’s tool with a hammer’s head on one end and an axe on the other.
Salhani becomes visibly agitated when recounting the events, fidgeting nervously with an intense stare in his grey eyes.
“I was in a taxi when it started,” he tells NOW. “When I got home, we started hearing people talk about a massacre happening. Later, I found out the taxi I was in was stopped at a checkpoint, and we never heard anything about the others in it again. The taxi driver’s name was Ahmad Hishme.”
“My sister lost her husband in that massacre. I was one of the lucky ones,” he adds, his eyes moistening.
67-year-old Hajj Abu Imad al-Masri had an equally near miss with the Lebanese militiamen.
“That night I saw women and children running, screaming about a massacre,” he told NOW. “Sharon’s forces were set and ready on the Kuwait embassy, along with the Saad Haddad militia [the ‘South Lebanon Army’]. They came in from al-Rihab Street with axes, and managed even to get to al-Gaza Hospital, where they slaughtered a lot of people.”
“We had small underground shelters, where we were able to hide families.” Even so, they weren’t always beyond the militiamen’s reach.
“I remember the story of a guy we called ‘the survivor,’” said Masri. “He was hiding along with 25 families in an underground shelter and insisted on going out to get cigarettes. They caught him [and] he ended up telling them about the shelter. They took all the men aside, took their wallets, and then made them all face a wall. They executed all of them, except ‘the survivor,’ who took 15 bullets but didn’t die.”
Yet for all the pain still clearly evoked by the memory of the massacre, the Shatila residents with whom NOW spoke said Sharon’s death was of little consequence to their overall plight.
“Personally, I would rather he stayed in a coma,” said Ziad Himmo, general secretary of the camp’s Popular Committee. “Or was just tossed into a field, like what happens to our people.”
Asked if he would have wanted to see Sharon face trial for war crimes, Himmo told NOW this would be missing the point.
“It’s not just about Sharon. The whole Zionist state is the problem.”
“I have no feelings about the death of Sharon,” said Salhani. “What about Saad Haddad? And Antoine Lahad [Haddad’s successor]? A lot of people should be held accountable.”
The insinuation that justice was still yet to be served was summarized by Masri.
“Israel should be held accountable, and not only Sharon, which is why his death means nothing to me. But who will hold Israel accountable? The same countries trying to help it become stronger now?”
NOW speaks with Palestinian survivors of the infamous 1982 massacre.
SHATILA, Lebanon: On Monday afternoon, only a few hundred kilometers away from Beirut, the recently-deceased former Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, was being laid to final rest in the Negev desert, where he was eulogized by national and international dignitaries as a “great leader” whose “memory will forever be kept in the nation’s heart.”
But in the mud-caked, bare-brick labyrinth of narrow alleyways in Beirut’s Shatila refugee camp, some streets scarcely wide enough for one adult to pass, Sharon’s name was remembered by the Palestinian residents for something other than greatness.
“I was 12 years old at the time. I remember standing right here,” said one resident who gave his name only as Fadi, pointing to the rusted metal doorway of his apartment on one of the camp’s numberless streets. “It was nighttime, and there were lights flying high up in the air. And I was wondering, who’s making these lights? And why?”
It was September, 1982. The answer to Fadi’s question, we now know, is that the lights were flares, fired by Israeli troops who had occupied the city weeks earlier following a bloody ground and air assault campaign masterminded by then-Defense Minister Sharon. The flares provided illumination for Lebanese militiamen, allied with Israel at the time, who entered the camp and committed perhaps the most infamous massacre of the 15-year civil war, in which over a thousand civilian men, women, and children were killed with the knowledge of the Israeli forces encircling the camp. Many of the victims were raped and hacked with blades. An official Israeli inquiry later found Sharon “indirectly responsible” for the massacre and recommended that he be removed from his post. To his critics, he would forever be known as the “Butcher of Beirut” thenceforth.
On top of the wardrobe in his bedroom, 83-year-old Hajj Abu Ahmad al-Salhani still keeps a remarkable memento of the slaughter that nearly claimed his life. “This is one of the actual weapons they used on us,” he tells NOW, holding up an old workman’s tool with a hammer’s head on one end and an axe on the other.
Salhani becomes visibly agitated when recounting the events, fidgeting nervously with an intense stare in his grey eyes.
“I was in a taxi when it started,” he tells NOW. “When I got home, we started hearing people talk about a massacre happening. Later, I found out the taxi I was in was stopped at a checkpoint, and we never heard anything about the others in it again. The taxi driver’s name was Ahmad Hishme.”
“My sister lost her husband in that massacre. I was one of the lucky ones,” he adds, his eyes moistening.
67-year-old Hajj Abu Imad al-Masri had an equally near miss with the Lebanese militiamen.
“That night I saw women and children running, screaming about a massacre,” he told NOW. “Sharon’s forces were set and ready on the Kuwait embassy, along with the Saad Haddad militia [the ‘South Lebanon Army’]. They came in from al-Rihab Street with axes, and managed even to get to al-Gaza Hospital, where they slaughtered a lot of people.”
“We had small underground shelters, where we were able to hide families.” Even so, they weren’t always beyond the militiamen’s reach.
“I remember the story of a guy we called ‘the survivor,’” said Masri. “He was hiding along with 25 families in an underground shelter and insisted on going out to get cigarettes. They caught him [and] he ended up telling them about the shelter. They took all the men aside, took their wallets, and then made them all face a wall. They executed all of them, except ‘the survivor,’ who took 15 bullets but didn’t die.”
Yet for all the pain still clearly evoked by the memory of the massacre, the Shatila residents with whom NOW spoke said Sharon’s death was of little consequence to their overall plight.
“Personally, I would rather he stayed in a coma,” said Ziad Himmo, general secretary of the camp’s Popular Committee. “Or was just tossed into a field, like what happens to our people.”
Asked if he would have wanted to see Sharon face trial for war crimes, Himmo told NOW this would be missing the point.
“It’s not just about Sharon. The whole Zionist state is the problem.”
“I have no feelings about the death of Sharon,” said Salhani. “What about Saad Haddad? And Antoine Lahad [Haddad’s successor]? A lot of people should be held accountable.”
The insinuation that justice was still yet to be served was summarized by Masri.
“Israel should be held accountable, and not only Sharon, which is why his death means nothing to me. But who will hold Israel accountable? The same countries trying to help it become stronger now?”
Sunday, January 12, 2014
What is March 14's new "civil resistance"?
[Originally posted at NOW]
Coalition launches new campaign to “liberate” Lebanon from Hezbollah’s arms, but some supporters remain skeptical.
At the funeral of slain former ambassador and March 14 minister Mohamad Chatah in Downtown Beirut on 29 December, a leader of the anti-Damascus bloc and former close colleague of Chatah’s declared the birth of a new chapter in the coalition’s nine-year-long campaign to rid the country of Syrian influence.
“We have decided to embrace civil resistance,” said Future parliamentary bloc leader and former prime minister MP Fouad Siniora. “O martyr Mohamad Chatah, [Lebanon] after your assassination will not be the same as before it.”
The phrase “civil resistance” – a jab at March 14’s arch-rival, Hezbollah, which styles itself on its flag as “the Islamic resistance” – has since become the official name of the coalition’s new campaign, which will seek to combine grassroots activism, measures at the domestic parliamentary level, and lobbying of the international community to “liberate” the country, in Siniora’s words, from “illegitimate arms.”
“It is a non-traditional way to say no to the illegal arms in Lebanon,” said Fares Soueid, head of the March 14 General Secretariat. “We tried all the traditional channels between 2005 and 2012: the dialogue table; the national coalition government; the Doha Agreement. After our failure to reach any agreement or compromise with Hezbollah concerning the building of the state […] we are shifting to civil resistance,” he told NOW.
What this will mean in terms of specific policy measures and actions is yet to be finalized. The only step confirmed by Soueid to NOW was a total suspension of ties with Hezbollah, the party-cum-militia implicitly blamed by Future Movement leader MP Saad Hariri for the assassination of Chatah on 27 December.
“We are not going to make the same mistake as the European Union, of dividing Hezbollah into a political and military branch. For us, there is only one Hezbollah, which works in politics with a gun in its hands.”
Beyond this, another likely component, according to Soueid, will be an effort to leverage March 14’s international relationships in order to pass a new UN Security Council resolution to “assure the neutrality of Lebanon” with respect to ongoing turmoil in the region – particularly the Syrian conflict, in which Hezbollah is a significant paramilitary participant, and to which Chatah’s assassination has been linked by various analysts.
The coalition may also decide to once again boycott parliament, said Soueid, as they did for several months following the October 2012 assassination of police intelligence chief Wissam al-Hassan. Mass street demonstrations might also be organized. “These are all [options] in our hands,” Soueid told NOW.
Asked how long the campaign would last, Soueid implied it was open-ended.
“We are talking about civil resistance. It’s not like a medical prescription, it’s a process. So we are going to begin slowly, but surely, and we are going to win.”
The launch of the campaign has been met with mixed reactions from March 14 activists at the grassroots level. Some are enthusiastic, spreading the word on social media – dedicated Facebook and Twitter pages have been created – and even spray-painting graffiti in support.
“There’s always more that can be done, but actually this time, we are doing our maximum,” said Karim Rifai, a March 14 activist prominent on the ground. “We consider that we are mobilizing people for the last sprint,” he told NOW.
“It’s the only way out of what we’re in,” said Walid Fakhreddine, head of the March 14-aligned Democratic Left Movement. “It’s a serious campaign, and more is yet to come, but nothing is going to be made public beforehand. In the upcoming two or three days, there will be announcements of further actions.”
Others, however, took a less hopeful view, questioning the campaign’s strategic clarity and the coalition’s commitment to seeing it through to fruition.
“Until now, I don’t think they were able to translate ‘civil resistance’ into anything tangible,” said Sara Assaf, another longtime grassroots March 14 activist. “I think the problem is it’s just a slogan that was launched, and then as usual they will not really translate it into any efficient action on the ground.”
Moreover, Assaf queried the sincerity of the campaign, in light of recent reports that March 14 is contemplating forming a new cabinet in partnership with Hezbollah after all.
“You cannot come and launch a slogan like ‘civil resistance’ and say you took a major decision to ‘liberate Lebanon from the occupation of illegitimate weapons,’ as Siniora said, and then days later start bargaining on a government with Hezbollah. It doesn’t make sense […] This would be covering Hezbollah in its sectarian war in Syria, at a time when the Special Tribunal for Lebanon [trial] is due to start,” Assaf added.
“The contradiction here is huge and it’s very disappointing for people like me and many others in the March 14 public.”
Other still are doubtful that the “liberation” envisaged by Siniora is possible at all, in the face of powerful international obstacles.
“The title is big, and it’s a very nice title, but so far it’s just that,” said Mustafa Fahs, a political analyst sympathetic to March 14’s broader goals. “Circumstances today are very difficult, and go way beyond this title.”
“There is a regional conflict today, and we in Lebanon are merely tiny details in it.”
Coalition launches new campaign to “liberate” Lebanon from Hezbollah’s arms, but some supporters remain skeptical.
At the funeral of slain former ambassador and March 14 minister Mohamad Chatah in Downtown Beirut on 29 December, a leader of the anti-Damascus bloc and former close colleague of Chatah’s declared the birth of a new chapter in the coalition’s nine-year-long campaign to rid the country of Syrian influence.
“We have decided to embrace civil resistance,” said Future parliamentary bloc leader and former prime minister MP Fouad Siniora. “O martyr Mohamad Chatah, [Lebanon] after your assassination will not be the same as before it.”
The phrase “civil resistance” – a jab at March 14’s arch-rival, Hezbollah, which styles itself on its flag as “the Islamic resistance” – has since become the official name of the coalition’s new campaign, which will seek to combine grassroots activism, measures at the domestic parliamentary level, and lobbying of the international community to “liberate” the country, in Siniora’s words, from “illegitimate arms.”
“It is a non-traditional way to say no to the illegal arms in Lebanon,” said Fares Soueid, head of the March 14 General Secretariat. “We tried all the traditional channels between 2005 and 2012: the dialogue table; the national coalition government; the Doha Agreement. After our failure to reach any agreement or compromise with Hezbollah concerning the building of the state […] we are shifting to civil resistance,” he told NOW.
What this will mean in terms of specific policy measures and actions is yet to be finalized. The only step confirmed by Soueid to NOW was a total suspension of ties with Hezbollah, the party-cum-militia implicitly blamed by Future Movement leader MP Saad Hariri for the assassination of Chatah on 27 December.
“We are not going to make the same mistake as the European Union, of dividing Hezbollah into a political and military branch. For us, there is only one Hezbollah, which works in politics with a gun in its hands.”
Beyond this, another likely component, according to Soueid, will be an effort to leverage March 14’s international relationships in order to pass a new UN Security Council resolution to “assure the neutrality of Lebanon” with respect to ongoing turmoil in the region – particularly the Syrian conflict, in which Hezbollah is a significant paramilitary participant, and to which Chatah’s assassination has been linked by various analysts.
The coalition may also decide to once again boycott parliament, said Soueid, as they did for several months following the October 2012 assassination of police intelligence chief Wissam al-Hassan. Mass street demonstrations might also be organized. “These are all [options] in our hands,” Soueid told NOW.
Asked how long the campaign would last, Soueid implied it was open-ended.
“We are talking about civil resistance. It’s not like a medical prescription, it’s a process. So we are going to begin slowly, but surely, and we are going to win.”
The launch of the campaign has been met with mixed reactions from March 14 activists at the grassroots level. Some are enthusiastic, spreading the word on social media – dedicated Facebook and Twitter pages have been created – and even spray-painting graffiti in support.
“There’s always more that can be done, but actually this time, we are doing our maximum,” said Karim Rifai, a March 14 activist prominent on the ground. “We consider that we are mobilizing people for the last sprint,” he told NOW.
“It’s the only way out of what we’re in,” said Walid Fakhreddine, head of the March 14-aligned Democratic Left Movement. “It’s a serious campaign, and more is yet to come, but nothing is going to be made public beforehand. In the upcoming two or three days, there will be announcements of further actions.”
Others, however, took a less hopeful view, questioning the campaign’s strategic clarity and the coalition’s commitment to seeing it through to fruition.
“Until now, I don’t think they were able to translate ‘civil resistance’ into anything tangible,” said Sara Assaf, another longtime grassroots March 14 activist. “I think the problem is it’s just a slogan that was launched, and then as usual they will not really translate it into any efficient action on the ground.”
Moreover, Assaf queried the sincerity of the campaign, in light of recent reports that March 14 is contemplating forming a new cabinet in partnership with Hezbollah after all.
“You cannot come and launch a slogan like ‘civil resistance’ and say you took a major decision to ‘liberate Lebanon from the occupation of illegitimate weapons,’ as Siniora said, and then days later start bargaining on a government with Hezbollah. It doesn’t make sense […] This would be covering Hezbollah in its sectarian war in Syria, at a time when the Special Tribunal for Lebanon [trial] is due to start,” Assaf added.
“The contradiction here is huge and it’s very disappointing for people like me and many others in the March 14 public.”
Other still are doubtful that the “liberation” envisaged by Siniora is possible at all, in the face of powerful international obstacles.
“The title is big, and it’s a very nice title, but so far it’s just that,” said Mustafa Fahs, a political analyst sympathetic to March 14’s broader goals. “Circumstances today are very difficult, and go way beyond this title.”
“There is a regional conflict today, and we in Lebanon are merely tiny details in it.”
Tuesday, January 7, 2014
Lebanon, where jihadists may roam
[Originally posted at NOW]
On Saturday, what appeared to be a claim by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), perhaps the most terrifying jihadist group in the world at present, to have carried out Thursday’s suicide bombing in Beirut’s southern suburbs began circulating online. Assuming it’s genuine – and at least one analyst is skeptical – this would be the first confirmed ISIS attack on Lebanon, and likely not the last: the statement added the bomb was but “the first small payment of the heavy cost which awaits these immoral criminals [Hezbollah].”
This is obviously troubling for all sorts of reasons, not least being the timing. It comes scarcely two weeks after the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, the official Syrian al-Qaeda subsidiary and ISIS’ most formidable rival in the theocracy stakes, told Al Jazeera that his men too have now arrived in Lebanon, where they will “protect the Sunnis” from the “Party of Iran.” That announcement coincided with the release of a video showing the mujahideen of the all-new ‘Jabhat al-Nusra in Lebanon’ franchise launching ten Grad rockets at Hermel, accompanied by a press release now helpfully published on the group’s Twitter account.
A coincidence, possibly. But Abu Muhammad al-Jolani’s 50-minute interview on the Arab world’s premier TV station put Nusra back in the limelight at a time when ISIS was making an increasingly catastrophic job of hearts-and-minds management in northern Syria (the further bungling of which would lead to this weekend’s extraordinary wave of attacks by numerous rebel brigades on ISIS positions across the country). The urge to one-up Nusra’s ballistic theatrics would only have been natural. Strikingly, Saturday’s ISIS statement even concluded with exactly the same quote from the Qur’an as did the Nusra one; selected – presumably not at random – from a chapter titled al-Munafiqun (“The Hypocrites”.)
In other words, Lebanon may soon become (if it isn’t already) an open arena of intra-jihadist showmanship and competition, in which ISIS, Nusra, the Abdallah Azzam Brigades, and any other takers outbid one another’s bona fides in the currency of civilian blood. Of course, in strictly military terms, this wouldn’t make a great deal of sense – Syria is still the battle that matters, and the road to Damascus doesn’t run through Dahiyeh any more than the path to Jerusalem went through Jounieh. Yet for the purposes of things like raising funds, attracting recruits, and general branding, jihadists still have a toxic sort of incentive to murder a lot more Lebanese civilians.
Back in August, a few days after the first in what has now become a series of deadly car bombs in Beirut’s southern suburbs, I suggested there were three necessary (if not sufficient) measures to prevent such a senseless descent into sectarian slaughter: full cooperation between feuding security agencies; containment by Sunni powers of the extremists among their ranks; and the immediate and full withdrawal of Hezbollah from Syria.
Five months later, we’ve seen almost nothing to suggest progress on the first two fronts. As for the third, consider what the Party of God’s Sheikh Nabil Qaouq had to say yesterday on the subject: “No matter what the size of crimes and car bombs reached, we will not change our position in Syria.” That is a challenge, I fear, that Lebanon’s new jihadist arrivals will be only too happy to take up.
On Saturday, what appeared to be a claim by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), perhaps the most terrifying jihadist group in the world at present, to have carried out Thursday’s suicide bombing in Beirut’s southern suburbs began circulating online. Assuming it’s genuine – and at least one analyst is skeptical – this would be the first confirmed ISIS attack on Lebanon, and likely not the last: the statement added the bomb was but “the first small payment of the heavy cost which awaits these immoral criminals [Hezbollah].”
This is obviously troubling for all sorts of reasons, not least being the timing. It comes scarcely two weeks after the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, the official Syrian al-Qaeda subsidiary and ISIS’ most formidable rival in the theocracy stakes, told Al Jazeera that his men too have now arrived in Lebanon, where they will “protect the Sunnis” from the “Party of Iran.” That announcement coincided with the release of a video showing the mujahideen of the all-new ‘Jabhat al-Nusra in Lebanon’ franchise launching ten Grad rockets at Hermel, accompanied by a press release now helpfully published on the group’s Twitter account.
A coincidence, possibly. But Abu Muhammad al-Jolani’s 50-minute interview on the Arab world’s premier TV station put Nusra back in the limelight at a time when ISIS was making an increasingly catastrophic job of hearts-and-minds management in northern Syria (the further bungling of which would lead to this weekend’s extraordinary wave of attacks by numerous rebel brigades on ISIS positions across the country). The urge to one-up Nusra’s ballistic theatrics would only have been natural. Strikingly, Saturday’s ISIS statement even concluded with exactly the same quote from the Qur’an as did the Nusra one; selected – presumably not at random – from a chapter titled al-Munafiqun (“The Hypocrites”.)
In other words, Lebanon may soon become (if it isn’t already) an open arena of intra-jihadist showmanship and competition, in which ISIS, Nusra, the Abdallah Azzam Brigades, and any other takers outbid one another’s bona fides in the currency of civilian blood. Of course, in strictly military terms, this wouldn’t make a great deal of sense – Syria is still the battle that matters, and the road to Damascus doesn’t run through Dahiyeh any more than the path to Jerusalem went through Jounieh. Yet for the purposes of things like raising funds, attracting recruits, and general branding, jihadists still have a toxic sort of incentive to murder a lot more Lebanese civilians.
Back in August, a few days after the first in what has now become a series of deadly car bombs in Beirut’s southern suburbs, I suggested there were three necessary (if not sufficient) measures to prevent such a senseless descent into sectarian slaughter: full cooperation between feuding security agencies; containment by Sunni powers of the extremists among their ranks; and the immediate and full withdrawal of Hezbollah from Syria.
Five months later, we’ve seen almost nothing to suggest progress on the first two fronts. As for the third, consider what the Party of God’s Sheikh Nabil Qaouq had to say yesterday on the subject: “No matter what the size of crimes and car bombs reached, we will not change our position in Syria.” That is a challenge, I fear, that Lebanon’s new jihadist arrivals will be only too happy to take up.
Saturday, January 4, 2014
What now for cabinet formation?
[Originally posted at NOW]
Lebanon’s nine-month-long absence of a government, which briefly looked as though it might come to a resolution earlier this week, now appears set to persist even further following Thursday’s deadly car bombing in Beirut’s southern suburbs, which came just six days after the assassination – also by car bomb – of former minister and ambassador Mohamad Chatah.
Efforts overseen by Prime Minister-designate Tammam Salam to form a cabinet have long been stalled by irreconcilable conditions and counter-conditions imposed by the country’s two key political blocs. The March 8 coalition has demanded a one-third share of ministerial seats to guarantee veto power over any decisions deemed unwelcome, while March 14 has in turn rejected the participation of Hezbollah in the cabinet so long as the party is fighting in neighboring Syria, in contravention of a bipartisan agreement reached in June 2012 to “dissociate” Lebanon from the Syrian conflict.
Nevertheless, Salam and President Michel Suleiman had reportedly decided to form a so-called “fait accompli” cabinet, composed of 14 neutral figures, by 8 January. That proposal has now seemingly been shelved – at least for the moment – in light of Thursday’s attack, with Salam telling one local paper Friday that he was giving parties one more chance to agree on an alternative option. Should they fail to do so, however, a number of sources suggested the fait accompli cabinet could become a reality once again.
“The Dahiyeh bombing definitely slowed down the cabinet formation process,” said an adviser to a current caretaker minister who requested anonymity as he was not authorized to speak to the press. “President Suleiman will now launch new efforts toward a ‘national unity’ government” – the option favored by Hezbollah and the Progressive Socialist Party, among others, under which all major parties would be represented – “to see if there is any change in March 14’s position.”
“But if these efforts fail, Suleiman and Salam will likely go back to the fait accompli option. This could happen as soon as 15 January,” he told NOW.
Other sources, however, suggest the fait accompli proposal will remain inherently unviable for the foreseeable future. For one thing, there are fears it could trigger violent clashes reminiscent of those in May 2008, when March 8-aligned gunmen occupied much of Beirut after deadly gun battles with March 14-affiliated opponents. On several occasions over the past few months, Hezbollah officials and their supporters in the local press have appeared to either imply or directly threaten such an outcome. On Monday, March 8 sources reportedly told the Al-Akhbar newspaper that a fait accompli cabinet would be opposed by Hezbollah “even if it meant storming the Grand Serail,” the seat of the prime minister.
“They are threatening [violence], definitely,” said former MP Mosbah al-Ahdab of the Democratic Renewal (Tajaddod) Movement. Ahdab characterized the March 8 stance to NOW as follows: “Either you accept a cabinet with a blocking third, or a cabinet that they call ‘national unity’ that is impossible to implement... [Otherwise,] we will go down to the streets.”
Another problem with the fait accompli option, according to Future Movement MP Bassem al-Shab, is opposition to it from the Maronite Patriarch, which is of particular significance in light of the ostensibly impending presidential elections.
“Salam and Suleiman are unlikely to go for such a cabinet when the Maronite hierarchy is against it,” Shab told NOW. “If there is a fait accompli cabinet, it means for sure there won’t be presidential elections, because one side will boycott them.”
For that reason, Shab suggested the cabinet formation question may be sidelined until consensus is reached on the next presidential candidate, the election of whom will require a new cabinet in any case, according to the constitution.
“If there’s no government, there may be an incentive to find a common [presidential] candidate which would open the way to a new government. I think it’s going to push all parties to agree on a common candidate.”
Lebanon’s nine-month-long absence of a government, which briefly looked as though it might come to a resolution earlier this week, now appears set to persist even further following Thursday’s deadly car bombing in Beirut’s southern suburbs, which came just six days after the assassination – also by car bomb – of former minister and ambassador Mohamad Chatah.
Efforts overseen by Prime Minister-designate Tammam Salam to form a cabinet have long been stalled by irreconcilable conditions and counter-conditions imposed by the country’s two key political blocs. The March 8 coalition has demanded a one-third share of ministerial seats to guarantee veto power over any decisions deemed unwelcome, while March 14 has in turn rejected the participation of Hezbollah in the cabinet so long as the party is fighting in neighboring Syria, in contravention of a bipartisan agreement reached in June 2012 to “dissociate” Lebanon from the Syrian conflict.
Nevertheless, Salam and President Michel Suleiman had reportedly decided to form a so-called “fait accompli” cabinet, composed of 14 neutral figures, by 8 January. That proposal has now seemingly been shelved – at least for the moment – in light of Thursday’s attack, with Salam telling one local paper Friday that he was giving parties one more chance to agree on an alternative option. Should they fail to do so, however, a number of sources suggested the fait accompli cabinet could become a reality once again.
“The Dahiyeh bombing definitely slowed down the cabinet formation process,” said an adviser to a current caretaker minister who requested anonymity as he was not authorized to speak to the press. “President Suleiman will now launch new efforts toward a ‘national unity’ government” – the option favored by Hezbollah and the Progressive Socialist Party, among others, under which all major parties would be represented – “to see if there is any change in March 14’s position.”
“But if these efforts fail, Suleiman and Salam will likely go back to the fait accompli option. This could happen as soon as 15 January,” he told NOW.
Other sources, however, suggest the fait accompli proposal will remain inherently unviable for the foreseeable future. For one thing, there are fears it could trigger violent clashes reminiscent of those in May 2008, when March 8-aligned gunmen occupied much of Beirut after deadly gun battles with March 14-affiliated opponents. On several occasions over the past few months, Hezbollah officials and their supporters in the local press have appeared to either imply or directly threaten such an outcome. On Monday, March 8 sources reportedly told the Al-Akhbar newspaper that a fait accompli cabinet would be opposed by Hezbollah “even if it meant storming the Grand Serail,” the seat of the prime minister.
“They are threatening [violence], definitely,” said former MP Mosbah al-Ahdab of the Democratic Renewal (Tajaddod) Movement. Ahdab characterized the March 8 stance to NOW as follows: “Either you accept a cabinet with a blocking third, or a cabinet that they call ‘national unity’ that is impossible to implement... [Otherwise,] we will go down to the streets.”
Another problem with the fait accompli option, according to Future Movement MP Bassem al-Shab, is opposition to it from the Maronite Patriarch, which is of particular significance in light of the ostensibly impending presidential elections.
“Salam and Suleiman are unlikely to go for such a cabinet when the Maronite hierarchy is against it,” Shab told NOW. “If there is a fait accompli cabinet, it means for sure there won’t be presidential elections, because one side will boycott them.”
For that reason, Shab suggested the cabinet formation question may be sidelined until consensus is reached on the next presidential candidate, the election of whom will require a new cabinet in any case, according to the constitution.
“If there’s no government, there may be an incentive to find a common [presidential] candidate which would open the way to a new government. I think it’s going to push all parties to agree on a common candidate.”
The death of a statesman
[Originally posted at NOW, co-written with Ana Maria Luca]
NOW explores Mohammad Chatah’s political role and the possible reasons behind his assassination.
On his way to a political meeting of the March 14 coalition, Former Lebanese Finance minister Mohammad Chatah tweeted, “Hezbollah is pressing hard to be granted similar powers in security and foreign policy matters that Syria exercised in Lebanon for 15 years.” Within minutes, a car bomb exploded in Downtown Beirut, and Chatah was dead. It damaged six buildings around the Starco building, killing five other people and wounding scores in one of the most crowded business and administrative areas of Beirut.
It was political statements like his last tweet that led to Chatah’s assassination, friends, analysts, and fellow politicians told NOW. Chatah did not have a very important position in government anymore, but he was one of the political strategists of the Future Movement and the March 14 coalition. Considered a Sunni moderate, he was also a very vocal political adversary of Hezbollah and of Syrian government influence over Lebanese politics.
“He had a very dynamic role. He was a man of principle, was very involved in the decisionmaking in March 14. His killing will definitely complicate the mission of the Sunni moderates in this part of the world,” Mosbah al-Ahdab, prominent Sunni politician from Tripoli, told NOW.
“Mohammad’s mind never stopped thinking. The only way they could stop him from thinking was to kill him,” journalist Nadim Koteish, Chatah’s close friend, also told NOW.
Born Mohamad Baha Chatah in Tripoli in 1951, he attended the local Evangelical primary school and the International College secondary school in Beirut. He obtained a BA in economics from the American University of Beirut in 1974, and later a PhD in the same field from the University of Texas in 1983. Upon completing his postgraduate studies, Chatah joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington D.C. as an advisor to the executive director. In 1993, he returned to Lebanon as Vice Governor of the Central Bank, a post he would hold until becoming Ambassador to the United States in 1997.
In 1999, with his ally the former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri no longer in power, Chatah returned to the IMF in Washington as an advisor on external relations. He would remain there until Hariri’s 2005 assassination, at which point Chatah moved back to Lebanon for good, serving as a chief advisor to Prime Ministers Fouad Siniora and Saad Hariri, as well as Minister of Finance from 2008 to 2009. He remained a senior aide to both Future Movement officials.
Chatah was also a prominent public figure, regularly appearing on radio and television and posting frequently on his blog and Twitter account, where he would write on Lebanese political and economic affairs, the Syrian conflict, Palestine, the Arab uprisings, and Western foreign policy, as well as jokes and other light-hearted topics.
Hours after the bomb went off, analysts and politicians were still trying to make sense of what the former minister’s assassination meant for the Lebanese political scene. Some interpreted Chatah’s assassination as a message to politicians in the pro-Western March 14 coalition, especially Saad Hariri, who has been in exile for over two years for fear he might be assassinated.
Future MP Khaled Zahraman told NOW that “the assassination aims at intimidating and threatening March 14… We see in this assassination a resemblance to prior assassinations like al-Hariri’s and other assassinations that are investigated by the STL,” he added.
The trial of the case of Rafiq Hariri’s assassination is due to start mid-January in the Hague. The prosecutors charged four Hezbollah members and supporters with the crime.
Moreover, according to Koteish, the former minister was very active in the past few months in supporting a neutral Lebanese government. Chatah played an important role in the debate among political factions in recent weeks, acting as a political messenger between political leaders in the negotiations for forming Tamam Salam’s government. “He was more than a messenger: he was one of the most prominent Lebanese political engineers,” he added.
Zahraman stressed that the bombing was a message sent to intimidate the entire political faction Chatah was part of. “This is a new phase. The assassinations which we witnessed between 2005 and 2008 were trials by the Syrian regime to cause fractions in the internal Lebanese affairs through igniting sectarian divisions and clashes. It seems that the Syrian regime’s trials have failed earlier, so they are now using the methods of assassinations again now to provoke more fractions and tension,” Zahraman said.
Analysts don’t expect a great impact on the Lebanese Sunni community. “Whoever killed Chatah was very smart,” Koteish argued. “Mohammad Chatah was not a prominent Sunni figure whose death would translate among the Sunnis as an attack on the Sunni community. He was a Lebanese moderate figure,” Koteish said.
Luna Safwan contributed reporting.
NOW explores Mohammad Chatah’s political role and the possible reasons behind his assassination.
On his way to a political meeting of the March 14 coalition, Former Lebanese Finance minister Mohammad Chatah tweeted, “Hezbollah is pressing hard to be granted similar powers in security and foreign policy matters that Syria exercised in Lebanon for 15 years.” Within minutes, a car bomb exploded in Downtown Beirut, and Chatah was dead. It damaged six buildings around the Starco building, killing five other people and wounding scores in one of the most crowded business and administrative areas of Beirut.
It was political statements like his last tweet that led to Chatah’s assassination, friends, analysts, and fellow politicians told NOW. Chatah did not have a very important position in government anymore, but he was one of the political strategists of the Future Movement and the March 14 coalition. Considered a Sunni moderate, he was also a very vocal political adversary of Hezbollah and of Syrian government influence over Lebanese politics.
“He had a very dynamic role. He was a man of principle, was very involved in the decisionmaking in March 14. His killing will definitely complicate the mission of the Sunni moderates in this part of the world,” Mosbah al-Ahdab, prominent Sunni politician from Tripoli, told NOW.
“Mohammad’s mind never stopped thinking. The only way they could stop him from thinking was to kill him,” journalist Nadim Koteish, Chatah’s close friend, also told NOW.
Born Mohamad Baha Chatah in Tripoli in 1951, he attended the local Evangelical primary school and the International College secondary school in Beirut. He obtained a BA in economics from the American University of Beirut in 1974, and later a PhD in the same field from the University of Texas in 1983. Upon completing his postgraduate studies, Chatah joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington D.C. as an advisor to the executive director. In 1993, he returned to Lebanon as Vice Governor of the Central Bank, a post he would hold until becoming Ambassador to the United States in 1997.
In 1999, with his ally the former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri no longer in power, Chatah returned to the IMF in Washington as an advisor on external relations. He would remain there until Hariri’s 2005 assassination, at which point Chatah moved back to Lebanon for good, serving as a chief advisor to Prime Ministers Fouad Siniora and Saad Hariri, as well as Minister of Finance from 2008 to 2009. He remained a senior aide to both Future Movement officials.
Chatah was also a prominent public figure, regularly appearing on radio and television and posting frequently on his blog and Twitter account, where he would write on Lebanese political and economic affairs, the Syrian conflict, Palestine, the Arab uprisings, and Western foreign policy, as well as jokes and other light-hearted topics.
Hours after the bomb went off, analysts and politicians were still trying to make sense of what the former minister’s assassination meant for the Lebanese political scene. Some interpreted Chatah’s assassination as a message to politicians in the pro-Western March 14 coalition, especially Saad Hariri, who has been in exile for over two years for fear he might be assassinated.
Future MP Khaled Zahraman told NOW that “the assassination aims at intimidating and threatening March 14… We see in this assassination a resemblance to prior assassinations like al-Hariri’s and other assassinations that are investigated by the STL,” he added.
The trial of the case of Rafiq Hariri’s assassination is due to start mid-January in the Hague. The prosecutors charged four Hezbollah members and supporters with the crime.
Moreover, according to Koteish, the former minister was very active in the past few months in supporting a neutral Lebanese government. Chatah played an important role in the debate among political factions in recent weeks, acting as a political messenger between political leaders in the negotiations for forming Tamam Salam’s government. “He was more than a messenger: he was one of the most prominent Lebanese political engineers,” he added.
Zahraman stressed that the bombing was a message sent to intimidate the entire political faction Chatah was part of. “This is a new phase. The assassinations which we witnessed between 2005 and 2008 were trials by the Syrian regime to cause fractions in the internal Lebanese affairs through igniting sectarian divisions and clashes. It seems that the Syrian regime’s trials have failed earlier, so they are now using the methods of assassinations again now to provoke more fractions and tension,” Zahraman said.
Analysts don’t expect a great impact on the Lebanese Sunni community. “Whoever killed Chatah was very smart,” Koteish argued. “Mohammad Chatah was not a prominent Sunni figure whose death would translate among the Sunnis as an attack on the Sunni community. He was a Lebanese moderate figure,” Koteish said.
Luna Safwan contributed reporting.
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