Hezbollah's opponents divided over Iran deal

[Originally posted at NOW]

Despite March 14 officially welcoming US-Iran agreement, several MPs expressed reservations to NOW, though no broader strategic response is apparent.

When Iran reached a landmark deal with six major world powers this weekend to obtain partial relief from economic sanctions in exchange for temporarily freezing its controversial uranium enrichment program, the Islamic Republic’s allies in Lebanon’s March 8 coalition were quick to declare a victory.

“This is a victory for […] the resistance of Iran in the face of international pressure for more than 10 years,” sources close to the Tehran-backed Hezbollah told a local newspaper Monday. “Iran has managed to extract an international concession that it has the right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes.”

At the same time, March 14, the longstanding rival of the Hezbollah-led March 8 bloc, also claimed the outcome as a success on the grounds that it imposes new constraints on Tehran’s activities. The former’s General Secretariat Coordinator Fares Soueid said via Twitter that “[t]he ‘resistance’ has given in to the rules of the new international order, and this is a great achievement for all of us.”

However, conversations NOW had with members of various March 14-affiliated parties suggest a more complicated, indeed uneasy reaction; with many doubtful that Iran would amend what they see as its disagreeable policies in Syria, Lebanon, and elsewhere in the Arab world.

“I’m a little worried,” admitted MP Bassem al-Shab of the Future Movement. “What worries me is that this move has not been linked to a behavioral change in Iran. It is assumed that this goodwill will translate into an evolution in the policy of Iran, but what if it does not? What if Iran has more resources to pursue the same old policies? Frankly, we haven’t heard anything from the [Obama] administration, nor from the Secretary of State, nor from the European Union, to say that this deal will take into consideration Iran’s posture in the Middle East.”

“The main concern in the Arab region and in Lebanon is that [the agreement] gives Iran a kind of relief regarding normalization with the international community while it is still interfering in an aggressive and unacceptable manner in Syria, and more subtly in Lebanon, through Hezbollah,” said Antoine Haddad, secretary-general of the Democratic Renewal (Tajaddod) Movement. Tajaddod is not formally part of the March 14 alliance, although Haddad told NOW it was “sympathetic with their overall objectives.”

Hardliners within the Saudi Arabia-backed Future Movement were even more skeptical of the deal’s merits, arguing that the international community was being deceived by a disingenuous Tehran.

“I am almost certain that Iran will not give up on its nuclear program,” said MP Khaled al-Daher. “The nuclear program of Iran represents its ambition of widening its power in the region. Iran’s attempts to expand and dominate in the Arab region are clear. They are part of Iran’s [ideology].”

Other parties, while also striking a cautious note, said it was too soon at this stage to form an opinion either way on the matter.

“We are waiting for tangible outcomes of this deal because there’s an immense difference between talks and walks,” read a statement sent to NOW by the Lebanese Forces, March 14’s leading Christian component.

Similarly, the Kataeb’s Central Committee Coordinator Sami Gemayel told NOW last week that his party would oppose the deal if it turns out to “contravene Lebanon’s interest and hand the country over to Iran.”

Despite his reservations about the agreement, Shab told NOW that it was unlikely to have much of a material effect on Lebanon, and thus he did not foresee any significant strategic response from the Future Movement. Indeed, there was no indication from anyone in March 14 with whom NOW spoke that the deal would affect their broader political calculations.

“I don’t think it will change anything on the ground,” said Shab. “We’ve long seen an American and Western disengagement [from Lebanon]. It’s not like there was this massive support that’s going to be withdrawn.”

Haddad, however, took a somewhat more upbeat stance, arguing that the deal could be turned against March 8 if handled properly by the latter’s rivals.

“The very spirit and logic of this agreement is that Iran won’t deal anymore with the United States or the West as a ‘Great Satan.’ I think that Lebanese, Syrians, and other Arabs need to deal in a realistic manner and try to […] take advantage of this new climate in which Iran has to deal more responsibly and become more accountable to international law.”

“It’s a matter of concern, but at the same time, it’s a test for Iran.”

Luna Safwan contributed reporting.

Salam seeks small "elections" cabinet

[Originally posted at NOW]

Having concluded two days of high-level consultations with each of Lebanon’s major political parties Wednesday evening, prime minister-designate Tammam Salam now faces the crucial task of appointing the members of his cabinet.

As was already apparent before Salam was formally designated PM Saturday, this process is fraught with difficulty owing to the vastly divergent demands of the country’s opposing March 14 and March 8 coalitions, who continue to disagree even on the basic nature of the cabinet-to-be. Nevertheless, Salam has been forthright about his own vision for the government – which is noticeably, and somewhat controversially, closer to March 14’s than March 8’s – and appears determined to realize it, even threatening to resign if any parties prevent him from doing so.

In brief, March 14 has called for a neutral, non-partisan cabinet, while March 8 demands a partisan “national unity” cabinet representing all parties in proportion to their share of parliament. March 8’s Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) is also specifically seeking to retain control over the energy and telecom ministries; a prospect rejected by March 14’s Future Movement, which advocates a reshuffling of all portfolios.

Salam’s own preferences are markedly closer to March 14’s than March 8’s, whose “national unity” proposal he dismissed on the grounds that such cabinets have failed in the past. Like March 14, Salam advocates a strictly non-partisan and “non-provocative” cabinet whose “central task”would be to oversee the parliamentary elections scheduled for June this year. Accordingly, he also reportedly foresees a smaller cabinet – that is, one with fewer than thirty ministers.

“I’m 100% sure it’s going to be an elections cabinet,” said Democratic Renewal (Tajaddod) Movement secretary-general Antoine Haddad. “And I’m also 100% sure that ministers will not be candidates for the elections,” he told NOW.

As such, Haddad added the cabinet would be as small as is practicable. “My understanding is that it will be of 24 members.”

This was corroborated by a cabinet insider speaking to NOW on condition of anonymity, who added that “Salam expects the cabinet will only last about 6 months.”

Even so, a fierce battle is still expected over the appointments, especially to financially lucrative ministries. As NOW reported Thursday, the energy ministry in particular represents a significant financial opportunity given its control over untapped oil and gas reserves, and it is perhaps no coincidence that the ministry has already become a principal bone of contention between March 14 and Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt on the one hand, and the FPM on the other.

“My sense is that the energy and telecom ministries are the most strategically important,” Haddad told NOW.

The finance ministry has also been singled out, with Future laying claim to it, prompting accusations from the FPM of corrupt intentions.

NOW’s cabinet insider source said such wrangling over portfolios is ultimately driven by financial motives, “especially in an election season, when ministry funds can be diverted for patronage and campaigning purposes.”

Haddad agreed, telling NOW that while it’s also a question of “prerogatives and authority…. the practice under the last government shows that it’s not so innocent. It’s also about financial interest, and using these resources to indirectly finance electoral campaigns, because you can provide services through these things. And this is one more reason why these ministries should be in the hands of those not running for elections.”

Nor is this the only way in which electoral considerations are likely to shape the cabinet – indeed, they appear to permeate the debate at almost all levels, with Salam himself saying the only “obstacles” in his way are “related to the elections themselves.” One hypothesis making the rounds suggests March 8 may have granted concessions to March 14 on the cabinet’s make-up in order to secure concessions from them in turn regarding the longstanding dispute over electoral law – an assessment that Haddad described as “fair.”

If so, the implication is that a cabinet will not be formed until an electoral law is agreed on. How long this will take remains unclear, though Haddad does not expect too lengthy a wait.

“Salam has alluded in several different ways that he doesn’t want to lose momentum on this. I think he won’t take long.”

Tammam Salam: between Future and Miqati

[Originally posted at NOW]

Having reportedly secured the nominations of Future Movement leader Saad Hariri and, crucially, Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) head Walid Jumblatt, Beirut MP Tammam Salam appears to have sufficient backing to become the next prime minister of Lebanon when President Suleiman polls parliamentarians on the matter this weekend. NOW profiles Salam’s historical, political, and personal record.

Born in 1945, the son of six-time Prime Minister Saeb Salam, Tammam hails from a family whose wealth and prestige in the Sunni community date back to Ottoman times. An Arab nationalist who in the 1958 war allied with then-PSP leader Kamal Jumblatt against the pro-Western policies of President Camille Chamoun, Saeb Salam was resentful of his displacement as de facto Sunni chieftain by Rafiq Hariri in the 1990s. Though a reconciliation of sorts later occurred, when Tammam was first elected MP in 1996 his relations with Hariri remained lukewarm, and indeed he ran against him in Beirut in 2000, the same year his father Saeb died.

It was not until Hariri’s 2005 assassination that Salam (who had opposed the emerging campaign against the Syrian occupation) grew closer to the Future Movement, and though he never joined the party, he began thereafter to run on Hariri’s electoral lists; he eventually was appointed minister of culture in Fouad Siniora’s cabinet following the 2008 Doha Agreement. Following that cabinet’s dissolution in 2009, Salam became MP for the Beirut III district, running as an independent on March 14’s list.

Analysts thus summarized him to NOW as a March 14 dove – “between Future and [Caretaker PM Najib] Miqati” – a label further borne out in his somewhat conciliatory attitude toward March 8 magnate Hezbollah. In a leaked US embassy cable from late 2006, then-US ambassador Jeffrey Feltman recalls a meeting with Salam in which he “both defended and criticized” the Party of God, reproaching the US for labeling them “terrorists” and praising their alliance with Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement. Another cable quotes him implying that the party’s arms are legitimate as long as Israel occupies Shebaa Farms.

At the same time, since 2005 he has firmly (if quietly) opposed the Syrian regime, whom he accuses in the same cable of waging a “vendetta” against Lebanon and of posing the greatest risk to the country in general. “He never joined the bandwagon of insulting [Syrian President] Assad,” said one analyst who preferred to remain anonymous. “But he doesn’t hide his March 14 credentials.” More recently, Salam condemned Miqati’s cabinet for politicizing the Syrian refugee issue and failing to “fulfill its humanitarian mission.”

As a person, too, Salam is said to be of moderate temperament – a trait that may prove useful if and when the complex business of forming a cabinet gets underway. “Anyone who knows Tammam either as a public figure or in private knows that he’s a quiet person who approaches problems in a positive manner with a firm will to get a solution rather than complicating the issue,” said Antoine Haddad, secretary-general of the Democratic Renewal (Tajaddod) Movement, an independent party that has previously run on March 14 tickets. “He’s not confrontational, but he also does not surrender on basic principles. So if he is accepted by March 8, he could be a good prime minister for the coming period.”

However, another analyst told NOW he “doubts Hezbollah would endorse” Salam. Were that the case, Salam would secure the nomination only by a slim majority, and face serious difficulties appointing Shiite cabinet ministers. “I don’t see him as someone who is ready to appoint anti-Hezbollah Shiite ministers, it’s not part of his character; he has a moderate, dialogue-prone character.”

Haddad agrees, telling NOW that Salam may try to tailor his cabinet in such a way as to bring Hezbollah on board. “My guess is that he will try to form a government acceptable by more than the majority that has nominated him [i.e. Future and Jumblatt]. I think this is the purpose behind nominating someone like Tammam and not, for example, Saad Hariri. It’s a clever approach to try to rebalance the government without excluding the other parties.”

By the same token, however, should Hezbollah reject him out of hand, his viability as a prime minister would likely prove short-lived.

Will the Sassine bomb sway the Christian vote?

[Originally posted at NOW Lebanon]

When a car bomb laden with over 60 kilograms of TNT gutted the sleepy residential impasse of Ibrahim al-Munzer St. on October 19, it did not merely kill an intelligence chief, his driver and a luckless bystander. Situated scarcely a hundred meters from the bustling Sassine Square—where dozens of glass panes were instantaneously shattered—the blast also drove chaos and terror into the symbolic heart of Beirut’s Christian community.

Seated on the crown of the Ashrafieh hill and orbited by offices, cafés, schools, churches and a mall, Sassine Square is the social and commercial hub of the district. In terms of political orientation, while a large monument to slain President-elect Bashir Gemayel of the Lebanese Forces (now the leading March 14 Christian party) stands in the Square’s center, it is also often adorned with flags of the rival March 8-aligned Free Patriotic Movement (FPM). Indeed, in the most recent parliamentary elections of 2009, March 14 pipped March 8 to victory in Ashrafieh by fewer than 3,000 votes out of a total of 91,000 registered voters.

Such close competition raises the question of what, if any, will be the effects of the bomb on Christian voters in next year’s elections. Assuming the electoral law used closely resembles the 2009 law, as analysts expect it will, then Ashrafieh (technically called “Beirut I”) will once again be a key “swing” district, one of a handful upon which the entire outcome hinges. That the other “swing” districts—chiefly Metn, Zahle and Koura—are also predominantly Christian underscores the paramount importance of Christian voting in determining the overall winner.

For some analysts, the clear loser in this regard following the bomb is March 8. “It is definitely going to realign voting practices among the Christian community, especially concerning [FPM leader Michel] Aoun,” said Charles Chartouni, professor of politics at Université Saint Joseph and the Lebanese University. “I’m not saying voters will necessarily go toward March 14 candidates, but Aoun will definitely lose some voters,” he told NOW Lebanon.

This, Chartouni believes, is due to a perception among Christians that the blast was orchestrated by Aoun’s major allies. “I’ve spoken to a lot of people in Ashrafieh lately, and they are in no doubt that a kind of joint venture between Hezbollah and Syria is behind the assassination. What has hurt people most is that the criminals responsible didn’t care about the fact that these people are living in dense areas and thus the damage can be devastating. If intelligence services want to fight among each other, in a country like ours and in a situation like ours, it’s somewhat understandable, but to forget about civilians and the welfare of people in the neighborhood is considered insulting and disrespectful.”

Key March 14 Christians such as LF leader Samir Geagea and Kataeb chief Amin Gemayel have indeed explicitly accused Hezbollah and Syria of carrying out the bombing. Aoun, on the other hand, has declined to make any accusations, saying,“I will wait for the result of the investigation.”

However, a perusal of the Orange Room, an FPM-affiliated online forum, suggests Aoun’s supporters believe March 14’s reaction to the bomb will in fact work in March 8’s favor. “[March 14] shot themselves in the foot,” said one user in reference to the clashes between March 14 partisans and security forces following the October 21 funeral of the bomb’s target, Internal Security Forces Information Branch head Wissam al-Hassan. “[March 14] Christians are [going to] lose a lot of support,” agreed another. “Islamic flags in [Ashrafieh and Free Syrian Army] flags over [Martyrs Square] is [sic] a big no-no.”

In a similar vein, FPM-aligned Metn MP Ghassan Moukheiber compared the funeral scrap and the subsequent violence in Tripoli and Tariq al-Jdeideh to Hezbollah’s “black shirts” demonstration in 2011. “Storming the Serail and the presence of armed men the day after added ‘black shirts’ of a certain political party confronting ‘black shirts’ of another party. Therefore, there is an equality in the rhetoric of ‘black shirts’,” he told NOW.

However, Antoine Haddad, leader of the March 14-aligned Tajaddod Movement, rejects this equivalence. “The attack on the Serail was a spontaneous one. I’m not reducing its importance here, but it’s not on par with the assassination itself, and it will not have an effect on elections, whereas the link between the assassination and the [Michel] Samaha case will,” he told NOW, referring to the senior Damascus ally who pleaded guilty in August to plotting terror attacks in Lebanon in coordination with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Many Lebanese have speculated that Hassan’s assassination was revenge by Syria for the intelligence chief ordering Samaha’s arrest.

As regards the Islamic flags mentioned on the Orange Room, Chartouni isn’t convinced these will cost March 14. “There is no doubt that Christians are very apprehensive about Islamic militancy. But at the same time this won’t outweigh the fact that assassinations have been committed for seven years now, mostly in Christian areas, in which the victims were always on one side of the divide [i.e. March 14]. And the involvement of Michel Samaha has further confirmed the connection with a Syria-Hezbollah joint venture.”

Of course, this may all prove academic, given that no electoral law has yet been approved for 2013. With tensions already high and the war in neighboring Syria showing little sign of abating, much can change in the next few months. As Haddad put it, “there is a long time yet before the elections.”

Agnes Helou and Amani Hamad contributed reporting.