Lebanese, Syrian Brotherhoods unlikely to feel effects of "terror" designation

[Originally posted at NOW]

Saudi’s designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as “terrorist” organization is unlikely to have tangible effects in the Levant.

While much attention has been paid to the deepening rifts between Sunni and Shiite Muslims across the Arab world in recent years, it is the internal battle for the political and ideological soul of Sunni Islam that has seen the fiercest inflammation in the last few days.

In an unprecedented escalation, on 7 March the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia designated as a “terrorist” organization the Muslim Brotherhood, the Qatar-backed movement that advocates an alternative form of Islamic rule to the Wahhabi-Salafist strain established in Riyadh. The move came two days after Saudi, along with Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, recalled their ambassadors from Doha; the culmination of months of tensions deriving from Qatar’s continuing support for the Brotherhood.

While the “terrorist” label applies, in theory, to all Brotherhood members worldwide, NOW learned that in practice it is expected to target only those active within Gulf states, and in Egypt, where the new Saudi-backed military government has waged a violent crackdown on the movement since the July 2013 overthrow of Muslim Brotherhood-linked President Muhammad Morsi, going as far as to jail journalists working for Qatar’s Al Jazeera network. Specifically, Brotherhood affiliates in Lebanon and Syria – where they make up a significant minority of the opposition Syrian National Coalition – told NOW they did not anticipate feeling any tangible effects.

“I don’t think there will be any effect on us from the Saudi decision,” said Bassam Hammoud, head for the South region of the Brotherhood-linked al-Jamaa al-Islamiyah party. “It’s clear that this decision started with the bloody coup in Egypt [which Saudi supported] because they were afraid for their chairs and their positions, because the project Muhammad Morsi proposed is one of reformation and change.”

The mood appears to be similar among Brotherhood members in Syria, where questions had initially been raised about the fate of the opposition’s Syrian National Coalition, which is backed by Saudi yet also contains many Brotherhood members who will now be deemed “terrorists” by Riyadh. (As one analyst noted, it’s still unclear whether Brotherhood-affiliated members can even attend the upcoming Coalition general assembly in Cairo, where they are also now legally considered “terrorists”.) Muhammad Sarmini, a Brotherhood partisan and member of the Syrian National Council – which withdrew from the umbrella Coalition in January over disagreements about the Geneva peace talks – told NOW he expected ties with Saudi to remain essentially cordial.

“Even after [the Saudi] decision, there is no change in the relationship between us. The decision doesn’t touch the Syrian Brotherhood directly,” Sarmini told NOW.

One reason for this, according to sources familiar with the Saudi leadership’s thinking, is that Riyadh doesn’t deem the Syrian Brotherhood a security threat in the way it does the Egyptian branch.

“I do not think the decision will adversely affect Saudi allies such as the Coalition because the decision addresses terrorists from the Brotherhood and [especially] Egypt’s Brotherhood,” said Dr. Anwar Eshki, a former Saudi army general and head of the Jeddah-based Middle East Center for Strategic and Legal Studies. The Brotherhood denies accusations of involvement in terrorism.

“The Kingdom deals with the Syrian Brotherhood and respects the Tunisian Brotherhood because they are engaged in political work and have not practiced terrorism […] The Kingdom gives aid to the Syrian Brotherhood for spending on refugees and the needy among the Syrian people,” Eshki told NOW.

Indeed, Sarmini told NOW the Syrian branch of the Brotherhood in particular had long enjoyed warm ties with Riyadh – another factor making an abrupt breach unlikely.

“The relationship between Saudi and the Syrian Brotherhood was a good, positive one, and even a historical one. Saudi embraced members of the Brotherhood in the 1980s and opened the door for them. Even until now […] we appreciate their position and their support toward the Syrian revolution.”

Nevertheless, Sarmini and Hammoud still voiced strong objections to the Saudi decision. “Without a doubt, we consider this position to be one that needs to be reviewed […] We appreciate that Saudi is confronting terrorism, but this is not reconcilable with describing moderate organizations as terrorists,” Sarmini told NOW.

Hammoud was blunter: “This is a reprehensible decision.”

And the move has also faced criticism in certain Arab media, such as the London-based Al-Quds al-Arabi newspaper, whose editorial Sunday said the decision benefits the Iranian, Syrian, and Iraqi leaderships, and “identifies Saudi, objectively, with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria.” Indeed, NOW asked Dr. Eshki why he thought Saudi had designated the Brotherhood as “terrorists” before doing the same to Hezbollah, the Iran-backed militant party often considered Riyadh’s preeminent foe in the Levant. He declined to answer directly, telling NOW instead:

“From the womb of the Brotherhood came al-Qaeda, and from the womb of the Brotherhood occurred most of the terrorist acts in the Kingdom.”

Ana Maria Luca and Maya Gebeily contributed reporting.

Ladies, don't expect God's help

[Originally posted at NOW Lebanon]

It’s been harder than usual in Lebanon this week to escape the Lord’s omnipresence. In addition to the “normal” allocation of public space to the country’s religious celebrities, as well as the Papal paraphernalia still yet to be taken down (three months later) and the homages to politicians (each one boasting varying degrees of divinity), you might well have noticed the ubiquitous new billboards bearing the (mostly lugubrious) faces of the premier Maronite, Greek Catholic, Sunni and Shia clerics.

As those who have paused to read the text will know, these are actually not yet more expressions of sectarian devotion, but in fact an initiative by the Resource Center for Gender Equality, aka ‘Abaad’ (“Dimensions”), to combat misogyny as part of the “International 16 Days Campaign of Activism to End Violence Against Women and Girls”.

Thus each billboard bears the face of one cleric, along with a quote of his ostensibly condemning violence against women on religious grounds. The Sunni grand mufti Sheikh Muhammad Rashid Qabbani, for example, cites ahadith (saying of Prophet Muhammad) affirming that “None but a noble man treats women in an honourable manner, and none but an ignoble man treats women disgracefully” (see here for all four quotes).

This is all, of course, an outrage and insult to anyone who takes the cause of gender equality seriously. So far from being the torchbearers of equality, religious institutions in Lebanon – as in every country on earth – are bastions of patriarchy and Leviathans of misogyny: the gatekeepers of “traditional values”, keeping women firmly and permanently under the boot. How stupid do they think we are? Is this not the very same Qabbani who, in June last year, rejected a draft law criminalizing domestic violence on the grounds that it would “[harm] the Muslim woman and [deny] her of the rights granted [to her]”? Is this not the same Qabbani who described as “heresy” the idea of criminalizing marital rape, warning that to do so would risk “[a] mother threatening [a] father with prison, in defiance of patriarchal authority”? Are these not the cronies of the Jamaa al-Islamiyah MP who, last December, said “There’s nothing called rape between a husband and a wife. It’s called forcing someone violently to have intercourse”? Is this “treating women in an honourable manner”?

I don’t mean to impugn Abaad specifically – no doubt this campaign was well-intentioned. But asking for women’s rights from the religious establishment is like asking for Palestinian rights from a Zionist. The two are fundamentally antithetical. If women are ever to receive the justice they deserve, it will be by confronting and defeating the clerics, not collaborating in the whitewashing of their oppression.

The counter-Islamist: Talking to Maajid Nawaz

[Originally posted at NOW Lebanon]

Maajid Nawaz is not your typical democracy activist. For more than 12 years, he was a member of the UK branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir, a hardline Islamist party that calls for a global Islamic state that would invade and conquer infidel nations, forcibly veil women, and stone apostates and adulterers to death. After serving the cause in Pakistan and Palestine, he was incarcerated for five years in Egypt, where he began to question the ideology.

Upon returning to London, he abandoned Islamism and started the Quilliam Foundation, a think tank countering extremism and promoting liberal democracy, named after the first Englishman to build a mosque in Great Britain. NOW Lebanon spoke to Nawaz, who has just released a memoir, Radical: My Journey From Islamist Extremism to a Democratic Awakening.

The first half of your book tells the story of your transition in the 1990s from an essentially secular, girl-chasing hip-hop fan to a Hizb ut-Tahrir zealot. How did that happen?

Nawaz: The journey involved me suffering from a severe level of violent racism in Essex [in England]; both on the street from groups like Combat 18 and at the institutional level. In those days before the murder of Stephen Lawrence [in 1993], the level of racism in the British establishment was quite entrenched. That led me to feel very disenfranchised from society.

On top of that there was Bosnia unfolding right before our eyes. A few countries away, on the European continent, there was a genocide committed against Muslims. These combined to produce an acute identity crisis within me, which is where these ideological groups step in and push solutions that are black-and-white, which to a teenage mind can seem to make a lot of sense.

You spent five years in prison in Egypt in the 2000s, during which you began to have serious doubts about Islamist ideology. What made you change your mind?

Nawaz: There were two main factors, although I must emphasize it was a process, it wasn’t a sudden light-bulb moment.

First, Amnesty International adopted me as a prisoner of conscience. I saw people fighting for justice on my behalf who weren’t Muslims, and that had a profound impact on me.

Second were the discussions I had in prison with the “Who’s Who” of political prisoners, from the assassins of Anwar Sadat through the entire Islamist spectrum to liberal political prisoners.

After leaving Hizb ut-Tahrir, you co-founded the Quilliam Foundation, which aims to counter extremist ideology and promote democratic pluralism. How, in practical terms, can that be done?

Nawaz: There’s a grass-roots approach and a policy approach, as I described in my TED talk. We work on both sides. Governments have a role—for instance in choosing their partners and interlocutors—who they engage with. They have to make sure they aren’t unwittingly encouraging extremism. Media, too, have a role to be sure [in making sure] they are not furthering the Islamist narrative through their reporting.

On the other end we try to build up a grass-roots allegiance for democratic values in countries such as Pakistan. To directly compete with groups such as Jamaat-e-Islami and Lashkar-e-Taiba who are working to recruit young Pakistanis. That is a long-term solution. The Muslim Brotherhood was established in 1928 and it took them until 2012 to win elections in Egypt. You have to start somewhere.

You’ve founded a similar organization, Khudi, in Pakistan. What sort of obstacles do you face there?

Nawaz: Security is a big one. We’re talking about an environment where “secularism” has become an insult and a swear word; where democracy is viewed with suspicion and a synonym for corruption. An environment where people are killed by mobs upon the mere accusation of blasphemy. So we have to be very careful what we say and how we say it. But there are large chunks of the country, especially the youth, who are increasingly disillusioned with the status quo and are turning to our organization.

Turning to the Arab Spring, as someone who was tortured by President Mubarak’s infamous state security, what did the Egyptian revolution mean to you?

Nawaz: It was a cathartic moment, because the ideas of non-violent uprising that led to Tahrir Square were the sort of ideas that were being debated by us in prison all those years before. And in fact some of those involved in starting the intellectual input were my cell-mates—people like Professor Saad Eddin Ibrahim, the famous Egyptian sociologist, and Ayman Nour. So it was a vindication, especially because Mubarak is now in the very same prison we were.

Have the recent electoral victories of Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia been a disappointment to you?

Nawaz: Not really; they were expected. What’s more important in these countries is to have what I call a democratic trinity in place: a firm entrenchment of democratic values, democratic institutions and the democratic process. If those three can be rooted in society it’s more important than any one party or who wins the election.

In “Radical” you write that “If the West […] had intervened earlier and harder” in Bosnia, it might have limited “the spread of Islamism and [Hizb ut-Tahrir].” Does this suggest a reason to intervene in Syria?

Nawaz: It suggested a reason for Libya, because Libya was a very uncontroversial and legal intervention. The problem with Syria is we have to try and be consistent. As Muslims, sometimes we like to have our cake and eat it too. So when we disagreed with the Iraq war, we were the first to shout that this was an illegal intervention and it was Western colonialism, and yet in Syria we are frustrated that intervention hasn’t been possible. I am frustrated about that. The problem without a coalition is that now if states do intervene, it gives other governments like Iran and Russia the perfect excuse to say, “Well this is illegal, we’re backing the Syrian regime.” And that leads to a potential regional war between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

I’m sure a lot more can and must be done to help the rebels, but I’m saying it’s simply not analogous to Libya or Bosnia. It’s very complicated—Lebanon is there and suffering from sectarian fallout—so it’s one of these ones that’s genuinely stumped me, because I’m very keen to see the back of the Assads, but I’m not very keen to further entrench Iran, Hezbollah and Russia in the region. I don’t think anyone really has a solution to this.

Do you worry that just as Bosnia turned you to Islamism, today some young Muslims are doing the same because of Syria?

Nawaz: Of course, absolutely. In fact we know that a minority of the fighters in Syria are foreign jihadists. However, I think that those groups would capitalize on it with or without intervention.

Turning to Lebanon, your former Hizb ut-Tahrir leader, Omar Bakri Muhammad, currently resides here. Do you think the Lebanese government should ban him and other Salafist-Jihadists from the country, as the UK has done?

Nawaz: I have absolutely no doubt that he’s involved in ratcheting up sectarianism in the Syrian conflict right now. But he’s a Syrian national, so I don’t think it’s possible to extradite him at the moment.

In general we have to distinguish between extremist thought and calling for violence. Hizb ut-Tahrir is not banned in the UK, and I’ve argued for them to remain legal, while organizations like al-Muhajiroun, which was Omar Bakri’s in London, are banned and I’ve argued for them to be banned. The distinction I make is that groups that directly call for terrorism need to be outlawed, whereas groups that call for extremist thought need to be challenged by civil society.

Finally, might you ever consider extending your activism to Lebanon?

Nawaz: I would love to, but capacity is one of the issues. We are working very hard to build up and expand the Khudi model into other countries. We’ve already started training people in three other countries. It’s a matter of time.

March 14 Youth stages a comeback

[Originally posted at NOW Lebanon]

There were only a few dozen people at the Universite Saint Joseph car park at 6 p.m. on Wednesday, and for 15 minutes it looked as though the planned March 14 Youth rally was going to be a disaster. But then they began arriving—by the car, the jeep and the busload. One after another, hundreds of students from the Lebanese Forces (LF), the Future Movement, the Kataeb, al-Jamaa al-Islamiyah and the National Liberal Party (NLP) began beeping horns, waving flags and chanting. While the ostensible purpose of the rally was to call for the resignation of Foreign Minister Adnan Mansour and the expulsion of Syrian Ambassador Ali Abdel-Karim Ali, it was also a flexing of muscles for the March 14 parties themselves.

“God, [Lebanese] Forces, Doctor [Samir Geagea] and nothing else!” went the LF students, prompting al-Jamaa al-Islamiyah to retort, “There is no God but Allah!” Nearby, a circle of Future students chanted, “Saad [Hariri], Saad” and “God protect you, Free Syria Army!” Posters bore such slogans as “How long will our prisoners be in Syrian jails?” and “Respect Us or Leave.”

After marching down Ashrafieh’s Charles Malik Street, the 1,000-plus crowd gathered outside the Foreign Ministry and began by singing the national anthem. “We’ve had enough of always being ruled by Syria,” a Kataeb student, Karim, told NOW Lebanon. “Not only the ambassador, but the entire criminal Syrian regime has to go,” said Ahmad of the Future Movement. Various student leaders gave speeches, while MPs including Future’s Ahmad Fatfat, the Kataeb’s Nadim Gemayel and NLP’s Dory Chamoun shook hands and gave interviews.

The rally comes at what may be an auspicious time for the opposition bloc, as its incumbent rivals are increasingly squeezed by events in neighboring Syria. Since the surprise arrest of former minister and tight Damascus ally Michel Samaha on August 9, and the subsequent official charging of him along with Syrian National Security head General Ali Mamluk with plotting “terror attacks,” key pillars of the government—from President Michel Suleiman and Prime Minister Najib Miqati down—appear to be distancing themselves somewhat from the Assad regime. Even the defiantly pro-Assad Hezbollah leadership has reportedly been having private doubts about the relationship.

These unprecedented developments have left some analysts questioning whether March 14 is effectively rising to the occasion. “March 14’s response to the situation in Syria has been quite uneven and heterogeneous, which is a reflection of the state of the political alliance,” said Elias Muhanna, assistant professor at Brown University and author of the Qifa Nabki blog. “Some members have been looking for direct ways to weaken March 8, while others are taking a more cautious approach. Certainly there is a lot of apprehension about the fallout of a regime change in Syria. We're certainly not witnessing the same degree of enthusiasm to spearhead an international pressure campaign against the Assad government from Beirut, as we saw in 2005-07,” he told NOW by email.

Al-Hayat columnist Hazem Saghieh, too, feels that March 14’s response to events has been lacking. “Regarding the Samaha case, I think March 14 should insist on extending the affair, on using it as an entrance to investigating everything which has happened in Lebanon lately,” he told NOW. “Also, they should be more insistent regarding the treatment of the Syrian refugees in Lebanon. This is a political, moral and human cause which should not be dealt with half-heartedly.”

However, Muhanna also argued that their comparative inaction may pay dividends later. “In a sense […] this more cautious approach has worked to the advantage of Syria’s enemies in Lebanon. It almost seems as if the Future Movement has taken a page from Hezbollah’s playbook by sitting in the opposition, staying out of the limelight, and allowing the geopolitics to do the talking.”

Saghieh, too, cautions against an overreaction on March 14’s part. “I don’t think it’s wise to call for the resignation of the government now. Without wanting to describe the government as efficient, we need something; we need the bare minimum to keep peace. Peace is very fragile in Lebanon, and the removal of this government would not help anyone.”

If March 14 is to truly capitalize on the potential rewards of a weakened or even vanquished Damascus, Saghieh adds, it may need to reinvent itself fundamentally. The bloc is held back by “their lack of dynamism, and the way they conceive politics as something related to elections only,” he said. “Theoretically, they can gain a lot, but practically the question is are they going to invest, do they know how to deal with the changes?”

Salafists in the spotlight

[Originally posted at NOW Lebanon]


To the non-Salafist, the Bilal Bin Rabah Mosque in Saida can look quite forbidding, what with its large, calligraphy-smothered, jet-black flags—favored by al-Qaeda, inter alia—protruding stiffly from the entrance. But the reception is anything but hostile at the nearby apartment where we meet Ahmad al-Assir, the mosque’s controversial cleric who caught the nation’s attention when he led a heavily-secured 1,000-strong rally in solidarity with the people of Homs in Beirut’s Martyrs’ Square earlier this month.

Inside, a man sporting the signature Salafist facial hair—a full beard with the moustache trimmed—guides us to a sitting room, where he brings us tea and biscuits. Ten minutes later, a tall and lean Assir enters and greets us in the customary Islamic way: handshake for men, palm flat against his chest for women. In a prayer cap, grey robe and black slippers, Assir moves very little once seated in his armchair, and speaks in the measured tones of an intellectual throughout the conversation (in marked contrast to his furious bellows on stage in Beirut).

We ask about his movement, which he insists is non-political, though he admits that he has ties with certain parties, chiefly al-Jamaa al-Islamiyah and the Future Movement. “Politics is part and parcel of Islam,” he says. “But I’m not a typical man of politics. I’m an imam.” About his recent meeting with Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt in Moukhtara, he says “[Its] purpose was to introduce and get to know each other,” adding that they also “discussed the Syrian situation. It was a positive visit.”

He insists, moreover, that his agenda is peaceful, and he wishes no harm to other Lebanese sects. “My mission in the past, present and future will continue to be to persuade all Lebanese to live together regardless of religious or political beliefs.” He flatly denies that his movement is armed. “Even as individuals, we don’t have weapons, as was proven when we went to Beirut peacefully.” However, in the run-up to the demonstration, he had urged his followers “not to carry arms,” suggesting that at least some may have intended to do so.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, he seems happiest discussing Islam. We ask about the chants for “jihad” at the protest, which he says were misunderstood. “[When] people hear it, they think it’s only about weapons and fighting. This is only a small part of it. Jihad is also helping the needy with food; it’s also education; it’s also creating stability for our country.”

“Human rights,” he goes on, “are sacred in Islam, for Islam is a message from Allah to assure equality between all humans.” If this seems an improbably moderate stance, let’s be clear: The man is no liberal. He “encourages” women’s rights – but only “what’s permitted in Islam. If anything contradicts Islam, then of course we don’t consider it a ‘right’.” Similarly, “In Islam we have limitations for sexual freedom. Sex starts with marriage, and we don’t accept any deviations.”


He is equally uncompromising when it comes to his foes. The two greatest threats to Lebanon, he says, are “the dependency on the Iranian axis and the existence of [non-state] weapons. We saw lately how [Hezbollah] dealt with their weapons on May 7, how they dealt with the cabinet, and we refuse” these actions.

Finally, he also condemns the “injustice which we and the Syrians are going through.” Lebanese and Syrians, he says, “are one people in two nations; we can’t be divided.” He vows to continue his mission until the “massacres and oppression” cease, though he doesn’t yet know “when and where” his next demonstration will be.

As is typical of Lebanon’s labyrinthine sectarian complexity, the Sunni Islamist “street” is divided on Assir. On the one hand, Bassam Hammoud, head of the March-14-aligned al-Jamaa al-Islamiyah in the South, defended him, telling NOW Lebanon that, “The crimes and horrors happening in Syria have been rejected by large numbers of Lebanese. The media is focusing on him because he went to Beirut, but there have been have been many such protests supporting the Syrian revolution elsewhere in the country.” When asked how his relations with Assir were, Hammoud replied, “We have great relations with him as a brother and sheikh from our region, but this is not political.”

On the other hand, Bilal Shaaban, secretary general of the March-8-aligned Harakat al-Tawheed al-Islamiyah, accused Assir of stirring trouble at the behest of foreign powers: “In Lebanon, especially in the explosive regional climate, people should not use pressuring or inciting language. The Americans want to create a conflict that divides the Sunni and Shia Muslims. Why was everybody so scared about this protest, and expecting the worst? Because the aim was not to spread the gospel and the good message, of course.” Shaaban described his relations with Assir as “neither positive nor negative.”

To Hazem al-Amin, the journalist and author of The Lonely Salafi, Assir is ultimately insignificant. “The protest was exaggerated by certain supporters of Assad, who sought to falsely portray Salafists as the face of the Syrian revolution. In reality it was a big failure; there were not more than 1,500 participants. So Assir clearly does not represent Lebanon’s Sunnis.”

Nor does Amin believe the Assirists will grow. However, he cautions that this is contingent on the ability of larger, more moderate Sunni powers such as the Future Movement to re-establish their presence and assert themselves more convincingly on the ground.

Luna Safwan contributed reporting to this article.