'Spillover' to remain limited, for now

[Originally posted at NOW]

Though the prospect of Syria’s war ‘spilling over’ into Lebanon is often presented as a mere hypothetical, in actual fact the phenomenon has for some time been a fait accompli. On more than a dozen occasions in recent years, events next door have prompted Tripoli’s mostly Sunni, anti-Assad Bab al-Tabbaneh neighborhood to go to war with its chiefly Alawite, pro-regime Jabal Mohsen neighbors. Yet when a Free Syrian Army (FSA) official in Homs called on Lebanese Sunnis to undertake military operations against Hezbollah on Lebanese soil last week, he fuelled concerns that a hitherto localized Sunni-Alawite feud could grow into nationwide Sunni-Shiite clashes.

Such fears were only compounded when the FSA claimed Tuesday to have killed several Hezbollah militants near Damascus, adding to the three Lebanese Shiites reported killed earlier in the month, that rebels claim were also members of the pro-Assad party. Only a day before, a gathering of Sunni and Shiite notables in the Baalbek-Hermel district had called on Hezbollah to stop fighting in Syria in order to avoid “dragging Lebanon to war.” Hezbollah denies it is sending fighters into Syria.

However, analysts argue there are good reasons to expect ‘spillover’ from Syria to remain limited for the time being. For one thing, it is in the interest of both the regime and the opposition to keep the fight on Syrian soil, according to Riad Kahwaji, founder of the Institute for Near East & Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA).

“Anything is possible, because you cannot control the flow of events in times of war. But I think so far there’s been a strong effort to keep it contained within Syria,” he told NOW. “We’ve seen Hezbollah and other Lebanese [opposition] parties resist doing anything that could put [them] in a war situation inside Lebanon.”

This dynamic, said Kahwaji, is reinforced by the control exerted by each side’s regional backers – Syria and Iran, in Hezbollah’s case, and Gulf monarchies in the opposition’s. “With Lebanese Sunnis trying to lend a hand [by passing] on supplies to the rebels, and Hezbollah working for the regime, it might appear as if it is the Lebanese fighting a war by proxy in Syria. But the truth is both the Sunni parties and Hezbollah are themselves proxies to regional powers, which are using Lebanese tools to fight their proxy war in Syria.”

Syrian opposition activist Maher al-Esber concurred, telling NOW that Lebanese Sunnis and the FSA in general had “no interest in fighting Hezbollah in Lebanon.” Esber also cast doubt on the authenticity of last week’s call for Lebanese Sunnis to fight Hezbollah, saying the group issuing the statement was not authorized to speak on behalf of the FSA.

Others argue the likely terrible consequences of an all-out Sunni-Shiite war in Lebanon suffice to dissuade parties from launching one. “The fact that Syrian refugees in Lebanon have been spread out throughout the country – among Shiite populations in the south and in Dahiyeh, in the [mainly Druze-populated] Shouf, in [largely Christian] Mount Lebanon, and in the [mostly Sunni] north – tells you that a Sunni-Shiite armed fight in Lebanon would be devastating for all sides, and this acts as a preventative factor against such a sectarian outbreak,” said Dr. Imad Salamey, professor of political science at the Lebanese American University.

Salamey added that sectarian incitement would ultimately be of limited efficacy in what he argues is still principally a political, not religious conflict. “The struggle in Syria remains primarily one between a ruling government with different sectarian composition – mostly Alawite but with different groups, including Sunnis – and an opposition that is cross-sectarian, even if most armed groups on the ground may have Sunni religious affiliation. The struggle has not gone fully sectarian, and this to a large extent helps prevent a sectarian spillover into Lebanon.”

Nevertheless, Salamey believes, “the longer this conflict goes on, the more sectarian polarization it will entail. Therefore […] the Syrian crisis has serious potential to spill over into Lebanon.”

Kahwaji, too, cautioned that sectarianism could yet overcome the factors that have thus far insulated most of Lebanon from the carnage raging next door. “Sectarian wars can easily be started. The historical differences and cracks within the region are still very much there,” he told NOW.

“It would not take much effort to reignite these old flames.”

Yara Chehayed contributed reporting.

Syrian rebels gain, but for how long?

[Originally posted at NOW Lebanon]

The resignation of Syrian Foreign Ministry spokesman Jihad Makdissi on Monday is just one of a series of recent setbacks for the embattled regime of President Bashar al-Assad. The news follows a week of unprecedented military victories for rebel forces, including the shooting down of two regime aircraft in as many days, a pledge by NATO to deploy Patriot surface-to-air missiles along the Turkish-Syrian border, and a diplomatic breakthrough that could see European nations arming the opposition by March 2013.

At the same time, the regime has been bombarding the Damascus province in a thus-far successful effort to repel an opposition advance into the capital, while also gaining on rebel positions in the Aleppo region. Perhaps most significantly, US officials claimed Wednesday that the regime had loaded aerial bombs with sarin, a deadly nerve gas, following a second warning from Washington that the use of chemical weapons would prompt military intervention.

On balance, several analysts argue the momentum has shifted in the rebels’ favor, particularly in light of their newly acquired surface-to-air weaponry. “Assad has been relying on air power to keep rebels pinned in their positions. Their ability to challenge this state of affairs has given them more confidence and enabled them to carry out bolder operations, as we are currently seeing in Damascus, Aleppo, Deir az-Zour and Daraa,” said Ammar Abdulhamid, an exiled Syrian activist and fellow at the Washington, DC-based Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. “The rebels are gradually breaking the stalemate and gaining the upper-hand […] A de facto no-fly zone is being created,” he told NOW.

Yezid Sayigh, senior associate at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, agrees that “the rebels have been regularly and steadily improving their tactical performance since the end of May.” He cautions, however, that the regime “is still very capable of” using its air force and remains “very much in command of what forces it has left—and these are not insignificant forces.” Accordingly, he argues that “what looks like quite dramatic and swift rebel advances and regime losses” may instead be a move “toward a new stabilized stalemate around a line running broadly from the Turkish border through Aleppo to Deir az-Zour, versus the regime holding onto Damascus and the Lebanese border to Homs, Hama and then around to Latakia.”

Moreover, it is unclear how long the rebels’ surface-to-air missile (SAM) stocks can last. “Rebel operations and fighting capabilities have always been undermined by an unsteady flow of arms,” said Abdulhamid. “That a portion of the surface-to-air missiles in rebel possession seems to have been gained from looting the military bases that rebels conquered and not from external suppliers” means that “depletion is a serious concern.”

Opposition activist Maher al-Esber, however, believes the rebels have already seized sufficient quantities. “They took missiles from more than one place,” he told NOW. “Practically if, [for example], you have 50 missiles and [the regime] has 100 planes, you achieve complete deterrence.” Current estimates put the rebels’ SAM stockpile at around 40, against more than 300 attack aircraft.

Elsewhere, rebel gains in the north and northeast have sparked concerns about the prominence of Jabhat al-Nusra, a secretive brigade of both Syrian and foreign jihadists that has carried out dozens of suicide attacks in the last year—sometimes killing civilians—and reportedly played a decisive role in recent battles. In a rare interview this week with the Telegraph, a member of the group admitted that some of his comrades “hate the West and all non-Muslims” and “want to attack churches.”

According to Abdulhamid, while “the growing size and involvement of Jabhat al-Nusra is pretty worrying,” it remains heavily outnumbered by non-jihadist rebels. “Jabhat has its allies among rebels who share its vision for an Islamic state, but it has more enemies, as most rebel groups refuse to endorse [this] option.” Moreover, Abdulhamid foresees “clashes between Jabhat members and other rebel groups” taking place “after or even during the liberation of Damascus, [which] will ripple elsewhere in the country.”

As for the fears of chemical weapons use by the regime, Sayigh believes it is essentially a regime bluff. “[Assad] has been using the chemical weapons issue to sort of play a little game, to say ‘Look, we can make trouble, and equally we can prevent that trouble. If you want these to be secure, you need us, so they don’t fall into bad hands, i.e., Islamists.’”

Abdulhamid, however, argues the threat is credible. “The psychopathic tendencies of Assad and his inner circle have been amply documented by now. We cannot put anything beyond them. For all their manifest corruption, we are dealing here with people who seem to believe their own lies […] Assad might decide that he is a dead man no matter what happens, so he might as well die as a ‘hero’ of the resistance to imperialism and Zionism.”

Amani Hamad contributed reporting.

A Damascene conversion

[Originally posted at NOW Lebanon]

Wednesday’s surprise assassination of three key members of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s inner circle may be the most tangible military setback for the ruling regime since the armed uprising began in mid-2011. Though opposition sources contacted by NOW Lebanon disagreed over the details of the attack, as well as the precise extent of its military significance, they were united in believing it heralded a decisive shift in momentum for the rebels.

It remains unclear who carried out the attack. It was first claimed by an obscure Islamist faction, Liwa al-Islam, and later by the Free Syria Army umbrella group. However, these claims were dismissed by Maher al-Esber, a Syrian opposition activist with ties to local coordination councils, who sees them as political jockeying for street credibility. “They are trying to outbid each other. Each group wants to be seen as the one doing everything, when in fact they hear about these operations in the media,” he told NOW. “In reality, these attacks are usually organized by a single person, perhaps with the aid of an accomplice. The people who carry them out are later surprised to hear on the news that someone else has claimed them.”

For his part, Syrian Muslim Brotherhood spokesman Bassel Haffar, who divides his time between Istanbul and Aleppo, believes the operation was more sophisticated. "I expect this was a joint operation by more than one group,” he told NOW. “An operation this big requires a coordinated effort on the intelligence and security levels.”

In any case, opposition sources agreed that the blow to the regime was substantial. Haffar told NOW that, “[The victims] were the regime’s premier line; leaders whom Assad depended on for his and his family’s security. They also have influence outside Syria – heading activities in the region in countries like Jordan and Iraq. There is no doubt that their assassination has considerably destabilized the regime.”

However, while Esber agreed that “This is huge,” he cautioned that the bulk of the regime leadership remains intact. “There are still more dangerous [figures], such as Jamil Hasan, head of the Air Force Intelligence Directorate; Mohammad Deeb Zaytoun, chief of the Political Security Directorate; Abdel-Fattah Qudsiyeh, head of the Military Intelligence Directorate; and Ali Mamluk, head of the General Security Directorate. These are important people who are still on the ground.”

Nevertheless, Damascus-based activist Ahmad al-Midani anticipates a number of further victories for the rebels in the near future. “I expect to see major defections soon and possibly even the fleeing of remaining regime figureheads who might seek political asylum in countries still backing the regime, such as Russia or China,” he told NOW. “I expect victory will come soon, in a few days or weeks.” As it happens, on Wednesday the Guardian reported “immediate” defections in “[regime] units regarded as “diehards”” as well as the fleeing of several tank units.

But Esber believes the regime can hold off for longer. “Whoever thinks this is over does not understand the way the regime works. These heads can all be replaced. They have tens of aides still completely loyal to Bashar al-Assad.”

Indeed, Haffar expects a considerable escalation of violence on the regime’s part. “Already, the retaliation in Damascus has been fierce, and approximately 200 people have been killed across the country since the attack. We are witnessing an unprecedented aerial presence in a lot of cities. Escalation is the regime’s language at this phase.”

If correct, this is likely to accelerate what is already a rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation on the ground in Damascus. “The siege on most neighborhoods continues, although there are reports of the regime partially withdrawing from Hay al-Midan, which has been stifled for the past four days,” says Midani. “We couldn’t even get bread in for local families and FSA fighters. Even the Red Crescent has had to close its hospice doors due to overcrowding.”

Despite these setbacks, the psychological impact of Wednesday’s attack may prove the most meaningful. Esber says morale among the opposition rank and file has never been higher. “The people’s adrenaline is at a high, while the regime’s is at a low. The Syrian people needed something like this.”

Bassem Nemeh contributed reporting.

Syria's divided opposition: A convenient truth?

[Originally posted at NOW Lebanon]

For the Syrian opposition, Friday’s Friends of Syria meeting in Paris rounded off what was certainly an eventful week, if not necessarily a productive one. The conference, which brought together representatives of over 100 countries (with the notable exceptions of key Syrian allies Russia and China), came six days after a meeting of world powers in Geneva, the end product of which was rejected by both the Syrian government and the main opposition Syrian National Council (SNC) bloc; and just two days after an Arab League-sponsored meeting in Cairo, boycotted by the militant Free Syria Army (FSA) opposition group, among other factions, in which disagreements were spirited enough to result in fist fights.

The repeated failure of such meetings to satisfy the various established groups seeking to change the Syrian regime suggests an exacerbation of what has come to be a defining characteristic of the opposition: their deep disunity. According to Maher al-Esber, a Syrian activist with close ties to the opposition, these fractures persist primarily because of the differing interests of the opposition’s political and financial sponsors. “The major problem is that there’s no support for the SNC as a whole,” he told NOW Lebanon. “That is, the Muslim Brotherhood, for example, or other movements that exist both within and without the SNC, support their groups only. Money goes not to the institution itself but to individuals within it, who have their own political ambitions for the future Syria.”

Esber also cites the special case of the Kurds, who differ fundamentally with their Arab co-oppositionists on the question of national identity. “Some groups within the Kurds are trying to guarantee some independence in the future Syria, which conflicts with the idea of a united Syria.” Indeed, following the exit of a Kurdish group in Cairo on Tuesday, National Kurdish Council spokesman Abdul Aziz Othman said, “The Kurds withdrew because the conference rejected an item that says the Kurdish people must be recognized […] This is unfair, and we will no longer accept to be marginalized.”

This stance appears to have bred resentment among non-Kurdish oppositionists, including Esber, who claims that the Kurds “have not really fully contributed to the revolutionary movements inside Syria.”

The Kurdish dispute aside, Henry Jackson Society Syria specialist Michael Weiss sees the dominance of the Muslim Brotherhood as a chief source of discontent. “From the very beginning, the US outsourced the formation of the Syrian political opposition to Turkey, and what they wound up with was an umbrella organization controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood. This was sort of an inevitable outcome if the Turks were to be so heavily involved. So, yes, the SNC needs to be expanded and diluted at the executive levels, but the Brotherhood’s influence also needs to be reduced. They are not representative of the will of the Syrian people.”

Esber believes the international community should take measures to pressure the opposition to unite. However, SNC spokesperson Alia Mansour laments what she sees as the excessive attention paid to the opposition’s divisions. “Not everything is about how divided we are. The international community is to blame as well. We did not hear the world constantly asking the opposition in Libya or Egypt or Tunisia to unite itself. All this focus on us is just aiding the regime. Whatever our differences, we all have the same basic goal, which is to get rid of [Syrian President] Bashar al-Assad.”

Weiss agrees, arguing that the vast majority of new splinter groups lack credibility on the ground. “The SNC is still the only game in town, because it’s been quasi-recognized by international parties. The only other vehicles that need to be brought on board are the tribal groups and the Kurds. Once these three are combined, the rest of the minorities will follow.”

Ultimately, both Mansour and Weiss believe the international community is using the opposition’s divisions as a convenient excuse to avoid making more robust commitments. “The world is always talking and never giving us anything practical,” says Mansour. “Today, in the three hours they’ve been talking [in Paris], more than 20 people have been killed. These are all just ways of wasting time before the American elections.”

For Weiss, “If the West is serious and sincere when it says the opposition must unite and negotiate a political solution, we should all commit suicide, because we’re being governed by lunatics. There is no political solution for Syria, and [US President] Barack Obama knows it. They’re just kicking the can down the street until after the November election. The only political solution they care about is the one in Washington.”

Nadine Elali contributed reporting.