Anti-Syrian pogroms point to darker future in Lebanon

[Originally posted at NOW]

With refugees now fearing for their lives, Lebanon is edging closer to breakdown.

Abu Gaby’s life hasn’t been the same since Saturday evening. He’s not sleeping properly. He’s changed his daily routine – no longer using taxis after dark; “taking precautions,” as he puts it, “that I never thought about before.” His work as a filmmaker has ground to a halt. “I’m unable to focus on anything,” he says. “I’m thinking only about how I can stay safe in this situation.”

As NOW’s Rayan Majed reported Tuesday, Abu Gaby (a pseudonym) was one of dozens of Syrian refugees physically assaulted across Lebanon Saturday after news broke of the execution of a second Lebanese Army captive by Islamic State (ISIS) militants. Hearing his Syrian accent in a shared Beirut taxi, a passenger beside him asked him his name. He replied with a fake Armenian one, hoping it would spare him. Brandishing a knife, the passenger then grabbed him by the collar and shook him, saying, “I’m letting you go [only] because you’re Armenian.”

Under the circumstances, Abu Gaby was fortunate: many Syrians suffered far worse in the ethno-sectarian pogroms that ensued from Beirut to the south coast to the eastern Beqaa Valley. Pictures soon surfaced of Syrian refugees and laborers lying on the streets being kicked and beaten by mobs. In one case, residents in Baalbek tied up two men and left them as human roadblocks facing the traffic at the town’s entrance. Meanwhile, gunmen set up flying checkpoints on several Beqaa roads, checking motorists’ IDs and detaining Sunni Muslim passengers, leading one columnist to dub it another “Black Saturday,” in reference to an infamous 1975 massacre of motorists at militia checkpoints based on sectarian identity. Notices appeared on walls in numerous neighborhoods demanding the departure of all Syrians within hours, with one in Beirut’s Zoqaq al-Blat threatening those not complying with “slaughter or torture until death.” Tents in makeshift refugee camps were torched, prompting hundreds of families in Shiite-majority areas of the Beqaa to pack up their tents and flee to Sunni regions.

A sign of how frightened those doubly-displaced refugees are is the lengths they’ve gone to conceal themselves. In Al-Rahma Camp, the largest Syrian refugee settlement in the central Beqaa’s Bar Elias, a representative of the charity running the camp told NOW Tuesday there were no new arrivals as a result of Saturday’s attacks. “I heard they went to Jeb Jenin,” he said. A half-hour drive later, a camp official in Jeb Jenin assured NOW they weren’t there, either. “I have no information on their whereabouts,” he said, echoing what the UNHCR, the Ministry of Social Affairs, the municipalities of three major refugee-hosting towns in the Beqaa, and Human Rights Watch had all said as well. “You have to understand, they’re terrified,” said Nabil al-Halabi, a lawyer and activist who runs a local human rights NGO, LIFE, working with Syrian refugees. “They’re not willing to work with the authorities. They’re not even telling us where they are.”

Indeed, with reports Wednesday that the Lebanese Army itself has begun dismantling camps in the southern Tyre region, refugees’ distrust of Lebanese state institutions may yet grow more pronounced. “I never thought this could happen to me in Lebanon,” Abu Gaby told NOW of his Saturday evening experience. “I had the same feeling as when I was arrested by Syrian intelligence in Damascus. In Lebanon, I now have the same level of fear and worry as I had in Syria.”

Should these events lead to further and long-lasting deteriorations in relations between Syrian refugees and their Lebanese hosts, there could be grave social and political repercussions, analysts told NOW.

“What happened on Saturday is a first sign potentially heralding the breakdown of Lebanese society,” said Hussam Itani, columnist at Al-Hayat newspaper. “It’s very dangerous. We’re in a situation of total disconnection between the government, civil society, and all the middle grounds that could unite the Lebanese people.”

The underlying cause of this crisis, argued Itani, was repeated sectarian and political incitement against Syrian refugees by Lebanese political parties, particularly within the Hezbollah-led March 8 bloc.

“These incidents were not spontaneous. They are the result of three-and-a-half years of a discourse opposing the Syrian uprising and the Syrian people’s right to decide their fate, and categorizing the Syrian people as supporters of the Islamic State and opponents of the so-called ‘resistance.’ This created a tense atmosphere that only needed one reason to explode.”

An especial concern for the longer run is the potential future militarization of some Syrian refugees, emulating the history of Lebanon’s Palestinian refugees in the 1960s. To be sure, 80% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon are women and children. But the worse the situation becomes, the greater is the chance of a fringe minority developing a desire to take up arms, says Itani.

“This is an important question that very few are thinking of,” he told NOW. “If things get worse, the refugees’ reaction could turn dangerous, and it could turn uncontrollable. The lack of organization of the refugees makes them vulnerable to political manipulation.”

“They might today be occupied with their daily life problems, but this doesn’t mean they might not one day join the political battlefield and defend their interests.”

Myra Abdallah contributed reporting.

Arsal civilians trapped between shells and snipers

[Originally posted at NOW]

NOW talks to Arsal residents caught in theater involving Lebanese army, Hezbollah, and militants.

As clashes rage Monday for the third day running between foreign Islamist militants and the Lebanese army – reportedly in cooperation with Hezbollah – in the remote eastern border town of Arsal, the more than 80,000-strong population, which includes over 40,000 registered Syrian refugees, is caught in a deadly trap in the middle, between the militants’ guns on the one hand and intense barrages of incoming artillery on the other.

“Armed people were everywhere,” said Khaled Hojairi, a Lebanese Arsal resident who managed to flee the town at 2pm Sunday. “I saw them shooting randomly. I had to be very careful to avoid being shot,” he told NOW.

“Yesterday, [militants] tried to target an army position close to my house,” said Abu Muhammad*, another Arsal native who spoke to NOW via telephone. “I helped the soldiers to escape by hosting them in my house for a while.” As a result, a “direct armed confrontation” ensued between the militants and local residents who took up arms to repel them.

Hours later, Abu Muhammad said his home “was [hit] by heavy weapons, the kind that only the Lebanese army and Hezbollah have […] Arsal is now being bombed randomly, all the houses are being targeted equally without differentiating between one and another.”

Along with more than a thousand other Lebanese – but not Syrians, who have reportedly been forbidden to leave – Abu Muhammad was able to flee Arsal during a temporary calm on Monday morning.

The vast majority of residents, however, were not so fortunate, and the sealing of the only road in and out of the town later Monday morning forced them to remain stuck in the middle, under fire from all sides.

“The civilians are trapped, because they can’t go in or out,” said Carol Malouf, a journalist and activist who runs a Syrian refugee camp in Wadi Hmayed, the barren, mountainous region just east of Arsal where the militants – thought to be affiliated with the Islamic State (formerly Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham) and Jabhat al-Nusra factions – triggered the battle Saturday by ambushing a Lebanese army checkpoint, killing two soldiers.

“When [civilians] try to leave, there are a lot of snipers shooting at them,” Malouf told NOW. At the same time, “there has been a lot of indiscriminate shelling. Our camp in Wadi Hmayyed was hit and several tents were on fire yesterday.” A temporary truce effected at 21:00 on Sunday enabled the transfer of most of the camp residents to Arsal town center, but Malouf says they remain in significant danger there.

“The militants have checkpoints in [Arsal] itself and at its entrance,” she told NOW. “If [civilians] stay, there is fear they will be taken as human shields by the militants.”

Conditions are even worse for the scores of injured civilians who, according to Abu Muhammad, are being treated on the floors of overwhelmed local medical facilities, unable – due to the closed road – to be taken to hospitals in the nearby Beqaa Valley.

“It’s really bad, and we really need to focus on getting the civilians out,” said Malouf.

To that end, a ceasefire was ostensibly agreed upon Monday evening, supposed to come into effect at 18:00, to enable a delegation of the Association of Muslim Scholars to enter the town and negotiate the evacuation of injured civilians, the release of Lebanese soldiers held by the gunmen, and the latter’s withdrawal from Lebanon, according to Nabil al-Halabi, a member of the delegation who spoke to NOW moments after it had been agreed. The latest official information from the Lebanese army is that 14 soldiers have been killed and 86 wounded, while 22 are unaccounted for (many presumed held by the militants).

The ceasefire had not, however, come into effect at the time of writing, and was in any case not expected to be a lasting one. More army units were seen heading into Arsal and firing artillery just minutes before the ceasefire’s appointed time, and Prime Minister Tammam Salamdeclared in a statement not long before then that there would be no “leniency, truce or political solution” with the “murderous terrorists.”

Indeed, there are signs the military’s operation could expand significantly. In what appeared to be a corroboration of multiple reports of Hezbollah’s involvement in the shelling of the town, the head of the party’s religious council, Sheikh Muhammad Yazbek, said Monday “we will not leave the army [to fight] alone,” pledging to “defend [against the militants] with all the power in our hands.”

And, shortly after a Twitter account called “Arsal News Network”reported the presence of Syrian regime MiG fighter jets above Arsal Monday afternoon, the National News Agency reported a “series” of Syrian air strikes on “positions of gunmen along the Lebanese-Syrian border.”

Such developments would in fact be consistent with an assertion by the mayor of the nearby town of Labwe last Wednesday that the Lebanese army, Hezbollah and the Syrian regime would soon commence a joint “operation” to “put an end to terrorism along the border.” If so, the political consequences of such open cooperation between the Lebanese army and these controversial, polarizing actors could be far-reaching.

“If Arsal is being bombed by the Lebanese army, this is a problem,” said Abu Muhammad.

“And if it is being bombed by Hezbollah while the Lebanese army is doing nothing about it, this is a bigger problem.”

*NB: Citing fears for his and his family’s security, the source asked to be referred to by a pseudonym.

Myra Abdallah contributed reporting.

Dissecting the problem

[Originally posted at NOW]

Regional crises revive ideas of communal segregation in Lebanon.

Graffiti in Beirut reading "Yes to federalism" is altered to read "Yes to secularism" (NOW/Alex Rowell)

As the mangled remains of the 22nd car to have exploded in Lebanon since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis lay smoldering in a mixed Sunni-Shiite Beirut neighborhood last Tuesday, one young male bystander told a television reporter he only had one thing to say. “It’s either them or us. We can’t live together.”

It was a statement of an exasperation felt by many Lebanese – an exasperation that is increasingly leading some to conclude that the country’s decades-old brand of sectarian coexistence has failed, and should be replaced with something that formalizes or to some extent reinforces segregation along communal lines. Adding momentum to these currents is the spectacle of raging Sunni-Shiite warfare elsewhere in the region, particularly in Syria and Iraq, where Islamist extremists have literally demolished the post-WWI border and declared the formation of a theocratic state. At the same time, Kurdish separatists have seized the city long coveted as the capital of their future state and insisted they won’t give it back. Surveying these “great changes and historical turns,” Lebanese Druze chieftain Walid Jumblatt wrote last Monday of the need to “preserve General Gouraud’s Lebanon before it is too late.” (Gouraud was the French High Commissioner who in 1920 decreed the creation of Lebanon within its current borders.)

While few Lebanese seriously advocate the abolition of “General Gouraud’s Lebanon,” there is rising interest in ideas ranging from decentralization to regionalism to federalism. Significantly, enthusiasm no longer comes exclusively from the Christian community – a segment of which has advocated such measures since the 1975-90 civil war – but from a minority of Muslims as well.

At the extreme end are the militant Sunni factions calling openly for an Islamist statelet in the north. On Sunday, June 22, 2014, supporters of Salafist cleric Sheikh Salem al-Rafei in Tripoli held a demonstration during which they chanted, “We want an Islamic state.” Asked by NOW about the slogan, Rafei initially denied that it was intended to be taken literally, but later said he “believed in the Muslim khilafa [caliphate] regime […] this is the ideology I follow.” While he said the concept was “not applicable” in Lebanon, due to its religious diversity, he predicted “the struggle between Sunnis and Shiites will lead to the segmentation of Lebanon, just like Iraq and Syria will be divided into provinces […] The first [part of Lebanon] would be for those who want wilayat al-faqih (Iranian state ideology nominally advocated by Hezbollah) and the second for those who want a just state that assures equality for all its citizens – Sunnis, Druze, Christians, and independent Shiites.”

Rafei’s is a view firmly rejected by mainstream Sunni political factions, who officially oppose any such “segmentation” even in its mildest forms. “Federalism is an illusion,” said MP Ahmat Fatfat of the Future Movement. “Lebanon is a small country. The only solution is the state,” he told NOW.

Yet a minority within the Sunni community disagrees. “I am definitely a supporter of federalism,” said Nabil al-Halabi, a Sunni human rights lawyer, who told NOW the same fear of domination that previously drove Christians toward the idea was now duplicating itself among Sunnis, whose vulnerability “became more apparent” after the violent takeover by Hezbollah-affiliated militiamen of predominantly Sunni neighborhoods of Beirut in 2008. “Federalism will forbid any community from governing other communities.”

Nor is Halabi alone, according to Jean-Pierre Katrib, former spokesman of the now-defunct federalism advocacy group Loubnanouna (“Our Lebanon”).

“This is no longer a function of the Christian community alone,” Katrib told NOW. “You come across people from the Shiite community who are not hostile to the notion of federalism as they once were. You come across very senior Sunni figures – for reasons of confidentiality I cannot disclose their names, but I can tell you these are high-ranking, well-known Sunni figures, enjoying wide popularity – who welcome the idea. I’m saying this because I have met with these people at their request.” [Disclosure: Katrib is an employee of Quantum Communications, a sister company of NOW’s.]

Does it work?

To be sure, federalists remain a minority nationwide, and certainly have many detractors. Among the criticisms of federalism is that it simply does not solve the system’s core problems, and may even aggravate them.

“I don’t think it could work in Lebanon,” said Nadim Shehadi, associate fellow at Chatham House and former director of the Centre for Lebanese Studies at Oxford University. Shehadi points to the final years of the civil war, when the Christians in fact did control their own de facto canton in Mount Lebanon, yet partook in some of the worst violence of the entire 15 years – among themselves. “Controlling your own canton doesn’t necessarily mean homogeneity,” Shehadi told NOW. “So it doesn’t solve much.”

To this, advocates counter that federalism is less about cantonization than tackling inefficiency and promoting regional economic development.

“It’s not about separation or creating a shield for the Christians, because we don’t believe you can have Monaco in Jounieh and Kandahar in Tripoli,” said Albert Costanian, political bureau member of the Kataeb Party, who prefers the term “regionalism” to federalism. By electing regional representatives locally, rather than having them appointed by the central government, and giving those representatives fiscal and executive autonomy, Costanian told NOW that much of the chronic corruption of the central government could be avoided, while regions could pursue their own economic development programs without depending financially and administratively on Beirut.

Federalism or secularism?

Another common criticism of federalism is the argument that, by granting the premise that identity is fundamentally defined by sect, it perpetuates the same communal divisions that fuel the dysfunction and violence for which it purports to be the solution. As the slogan “Yes to federalism” has been spray-painted by graffiti activists across Beirut’s walls in recent months, it has elicited a counter-campaign by opponents, altering the text to “Yes to secularism.”

This dichotomy, according to Costanian, is a false one, akin to “comparing apples and oranges.” Indeed, he argues regionalism will “accompany the people’s march toward secularism” by abolishing sectarian quotas within regional governorates and allowing for regional legislation in favor of things like civil marriage. “Hopefully we will reach a totally secular system in a few years,” he told NOW.

By contrast, in Shehadi’s view, the two concepts cannot be married so easily. “When you have people of different identities on the same land, you have a choice between breaking down the boundaries or reinforcing them,” he told NOW. He cited the example of 19th-century cosmopolitan cities such as Smyrna, where for all the inter-communal mingling in marketplaces and public squares, each ethnic and religious group lived in segregated quarters, to which they would retreat and “lock the gates” at night.

“Of course,” says Shehadi, “in times of crisis, when people feel threatened, they become more sectarian and they want more extreme sectarian solutions.”

“But the bottom line question is, do you protect boundaries, or break them down totally?”

Myra Abdallah contributed reporting.

As bombs mount, Hezbollah edges back toward 'self-security'

[Originally posted at NOW]

The Party is struggling to stem a new wave of deadly attacks at home.

When on Tuesday a group of humanitarian NGO workers were leaving the remote northeastern border town of Arsal, the target of frequent, sometimes fatal shelling by Syrian regime air and land forces where the team had been aiding Syrian refugees, they might well have imagined they were putting the day’s danger behind them and heading for safer terrain.

If so, however, that illusion was dispelled when their van – clearly marked with the logo of their organization, the Lebanese Institute for Democracy and Human Rights (“LIFE”) – encountered an ad hoc checkpoint manned by plain-clothed gunmen near the town of al-Labwe, between Arsal and the highway that would reconnect them to the rest of Lebanon.

Ordered out of the vehicle, the five of them were detained for six hours, according to Nabil al-Halabi, LIFE’s director and a human rights lawyer, who told NOW they were subjected to hostile interrogation and even beating. Some, indeed, were left with “serious injuries,” according to a statement issued online. As a consequence, LIFE has decided to suspend all activities in Arsal for the time being, on account of the “chaotic insecurity” in the area and the “absence of control by the [state] security forces and army.”

Asked who he believed was manning the checkpoint, Halabi told NOW it was “obvious” it was Hezbollah, the party-cum-militia which has long maintained a significant presence in the wider Beqaa Valley region surrounding Arsal. The Party routinely crosses the Syrian border to do battle with Syrian rebels who, in turn, are largely supported by Arsal residents.

While Halabi’s claim could not be independently verified, recent appearances of temporary Hezbollah checkpoints in the same area have also been reported by NOW’s Beqaa correspondent, Abdallah al-Hojeiry. For around a month, wrote Hojeiry, Hezbollah gunmen have deployed on the Baalbek-Labwe highway, stopping and searching cars from Arsal and generating local resentment in the process.

Such measures, which come as the country’s security agencies struggle to stem a wave of deadly bomb attacks in predominantly pro-Hezbollah neighborhoods (including two in Hermel, the nearest large town to Arsal), are reminiscent of the abortive “self-security” program implemented in the wake of the August 2013 car bomb in the south Beirut suburb of Ruwais. For weeks, Hezbollah erected checkpoints at the entrances to the southern suburbs, a move that became increasingly unpopular, particularly after a dispute at one checkpoint led to the killing of a Palestinian refugee. In late September, the Party abandoned its program, handing over its checkpoints to the army, which maintains control of them to this day.

But with attacks now coming much faster – there have been five in 2014 alone – Hezbollah appears to be quietly edging toward taking security into its own hands once again. In the suburbs themselves (collectively known as “Dahiyeh”), the Party has markedly bolstered its street presence, according to local resident and political analyst Qassem Qassir.

“We noticed […] many of Hezbollah’s men are always on the ground – unarmed, but observing anything suspicious,” Qassir told NOW. “There is also talk of Hezbollah getting new tools and materials to check for explosives around the entrances to Dahiyeh. And many of the main roads leading to Hezbollah headquarters have been closed.”

In tandem with its own campaigns, the Party is also said to be pressing state security agencies to redouble their efforts. A forthcoming security plan for the south of the country, involving the erection of new checkpoints and increased surveillance of Palestinian refugee camps, reportedly comes at the request of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement.

Above and beyond mere security-related decisions, however, a broader political or strategic response from Hezbollah to the recent spike in deadly bombings has been more difficult to discern. While Party officials continue to describe the attacks in terms of an international campaign of “takfiri terrorism” that underscores the necessity of its continued military intervention in Syria, there has been no word from General Secretary Hassan Nasrallah since a televised address in December 2013 – an uncharacteristic silence which, some observers say, may indicate uncertainty within the Party regarding its next steps.

“There have been [six] explosions since [Nasrallah’s] last appearance, which raises a lot of questions,” said Ali al-Amin, a political analyst and Dahiyeh resident. “Doesn’t he have anything to say? Or is he unable to reassure people that everything will be okay this time?”

“Many among Hezbollah’s supporters are asking themselves these same questions, and maybe this time the leadership has no answers. Hezbollah has no means of predicting or preventing the explosions now.”

Luna Safwan and Maya Gebeily contributed reporting.

Syrian defector in Lebanon faces uncertain fate

[Originally posted at NOW]

A 30-year-old Syrian army defector in Lebanon faces possible torture and even death after being sentenced Monday by a Lebanese military tribunal to two months’ imprisonment and a 100,000LL ($67) fine followed by deportation, for the crime of entering the country illegally.

Muhammad Tlas, a former officer from Al-Rastan who had joined the rebel Free Syrian Army, was arrested on 6 December 2012, while taking an injured comrade to a Lebanese hospital, according to Nabil al-Halabi, laywer and executive director of the Lebanese Foundation for Democracy and Human rights (“Life”), who publicized Tlas’ case in a press release Tuesday.

When the military tribunal delivered its sentence Monday, preparations were quickly made to deport Tlas on the grounds that his two month detention had already been served, said Halabi. “He is now being kept in a General Security prison in the Beqaa Valley,” he told NOW. General Security could not be reached for comment.

In spite of these steps, the Lebanese government has hinted it may not enforce the deportation order. Interior Minister Marwan Charbel said Wednesday that though he had “not examined this case […] such extraditions are generally not carried out.” And on Thursday, President Michel Suleiman said on Twitter that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, no Syrians would be deported to Syria.

Indeed, according to Marie Daunay, president of the Lebanese Center for Human Rights (CLDH), the organization that assigned a lawyer to Tlas’ case, he has not yet been deported and probably will not be.

“It seems to have been the policy of the Lebanese authorities in the past few months not to implement deportation orders for Syrians, due to the policy of dissociation from the Syrian conflict,” she told NOW.

Nadim Houry, deputy director of Human Rights Watch (HRW) for the Middle East and North Africa, also told NOW that while Tlas’ fate remains uncertain, “most deportation orders in Lebanon against Syrians are not carried out. The last one we are aware of was…in August.” On that occasion, Lebanon deported 14 Syrians – some of them believed to be opposition activists – earning criticism from HRW and a number of foreign embassies.

Regardless, Daunay condemned the decision to sentence Tlas to any punishment in the first place. “The decision…made by the military tribunal is in contravention of Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture. This violation happened even though this point was raised in court by the defense lawyer.” Article 3 of the Convention, to which Lebanon is a party, states that “No State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”

Moreover, Daunay criticized the continued detention of Tlas, in spite of Charbel’s and Suleiman’s statements. “He is still pending deportation, even though he should already have been released.”

Houry agreed, telling NOW that “From [HRW’s] end, the first key principle here is no deportations for anyone fearing persecution or torture in Syria. That obviously includes someone who defected or decided not to do his military service. That’s a clear obligation; these deportations cannot take place.

“The second key principle is no detention of any Syrian, or person from Syria such as a Palestinian refugee, merely for being in the country illegally.”

Indeed, Halabi told NOW that, in the majority of cases, defecting Syrian officers and refugees alike had no choice but to enter Lebanon illegally.

“Whenever there is conflict in some area, it is impossible for rebels to pass through checkpoints and passport control; they have to escape and take illegal ways to a safe place. One cannot condemn refugees as illegal immigrants.”

“The Turkish and Jordanian governments acknowledge the impossibility of refugees passing through legal check points, and they establish refugee camps in many places. Yet the Lebanese government is still following and arresting refugees for illegal entry. This is unacceptable, on a legal and humanitarian level.”

Moreover, “the Syrian embassy stopped renewing passports, so now we have a situation where refugees cannot go back to Syria, don’t have the freedom of mobility in Lebanon and cannot travel with expired passports. Something has to be done.”

Yara Chehayed contributed reporting.

A feud in the corridors of Sunni power

[Originally posted at NOW]

A long-brewing feud in the corridors of Sunni power took a turn for the worse this week, in spite of mediation efforts undertaken Monday by the community’s premier representatives, with a group of Future Movement MPs describing Grand Mufti Sheikh Muhammad Rashid Qabbani as a “dictator” and “tyrant” in a statement Wednesday.

The controversy was first triggered by Qabbani’s call last year for elections in the Higher Islamic Council, the clerical body in charge of Dar al-Fatwa, the Sunnis’ officially established religious authority. The call was rejected by 21 of the 32 members of the council reported to be loyal to the Future Movement, ostensibly on the grounds that it was unconstitutional. The Mufti has dismissed this claim, accusing the 21 members of “working on dividing the Muslim [community] for political reasons.”

Elections, if they were to occur, could impact not only the Sunni community, but all Lebanese. The council’s role is not limited to Sunni religious affairs, such as issuing fatwas and managing the awqaf [financial assets] – it also holds considerable sway over national parliamentary decisions, according to lawyer Nabil al-Halabi. For example, a 2011 draft law that sought to criminalize domestic violence was blocked by Dar al-Fatwa on the grounds that it “violat[ed] Islamic law.”

From a strictly legal perspective, it appears both sides in the current dispute have grounds to argue their cases. On the one hand, the Mufti is correct in saying that the current term of the council members has expired, according to lawyer and council member Muhammad al-Mrad. Indeed, the term expired in 2009, but has been extended by decree every year since then due to agreement among members that extraordinary circumstances in the country made the holding of elections undesirable.

By the same token, however, Mrad told NOW that elections cannot be held without the consent of all council members. “It is not possible to call for elections without referring to the council. The council is the authority that decides whether the extraordinary circumstances are still present. Any call for elections by the Mufti must be based on a council decision that these circumstances are over.”

According to Halabi, the Mufti argues in turn that since the council’s term has ended, it has become a “caretaker” one, which does not have the legal authority to reject his call for elections.

However, protocol was also violated in other ways, according to Mrad. “Article 12, Item 2 of the 1955 decree stipulates that the electoral check lists must be published in the first month of every year. The Mufti cannot call for elections” since this has not been done.

In any case, beneath the legal dispute lies deepening political antagonism that may be the key driving force of the rift. Over the past year, the Mufti and the Future Movement have waged a public war of words over a number of issues, with Future accusing the Mufti of favoring their March 8 opponents, and the Mufti in turn accusing them of “slandering” him, “disregarding [his] dignity” and trying to “take away [his] powers.”

“Undoubtedly, there are political problems such as [the Mufti’s] receiving a Hezbollah delegation [and] the Iranian and Syrian ambassadors,” Halabi told NOW. “Some consider this a dangerous sign that the Mufti may take the council to another path that does not serve the interests of the Sunni sect.” Indeed, in their statement Wednesday, Future MPs accused the Mufti of “serving [Iran] and [Syrian President Bashar] al-Assad’s regime.”

The Mufti dismisses these allegations as “lies”, saying, “I am not one to be on one side and move to another like politicians.”

Others, including Mrad, believe the Mufti is maneuvering to extend his own term for the rest of his life. “I think there are personal calculations for the Mufti. His insistence on holding elections [aims] to provide a certain majority in the council, in order to extend his term for life. The law gives him the right to choose 8 members and there is someone who promised to provide him a majority,” that “someone” being “well-known parties that are controlling all issues,” likely a reference to Hezbollah and/or Syria.

The Mufti denies this too, saying via a Dar al-Fatwa statement that he would leave the institution when his term ends on September 15, 2014, and “go back home […] [A]ny other talk is just rumors and fabrications.”

At present, PM Miqati is trying to push through a solution that would see the current council remain for two to three months, after which time the elections would be held. While Qabbani has accepted the proposal subject to minor adjustments, it remains to be seen whether it will satisfy the Future Movement.

Amani Hamad contributed reporting.