What happens if there's no president?

[Originally posted at NOW]

Lebanon has just 11 days to elect a new president. NOW looks at what could happen if it fails to do so.

There are only 11 days left before the expiry of Lebanese President Michel Suleiman’s term in office, and two parliamentary sessions scheduled during which lawmakers may reach agreement on his successor. With the country’s key March 14 and March 8 coalitions remaining deeply divided on the issue, expectations are low that these parliamentary sessions will even yield the quorum necessary to assemble at all, let alone deliver a new arrival to Baabda Palace.

Should no one be elected by May 25, then, the question inevitably arises as to what happens next. Article 62 of Lebanon’s constitution stipulates plainly that the cabinet assumes the president’s powers “by delegation” in the event of a presidential vacuum “for any reason.” Prime Minister Tammam Salam has already made remarks to this effect, seeking to reassure citizens that the government would continue to function more or less as normal. Temporary presidential vacuums are by no means unprecedented in Lebanon – indeed, a six month interregnum occurred at the end of the term of Suleiman’s predecessor, Emile Lahoud.

There are, however, other possibilities. One is an extension of Suleiman’s term until a successor is found. This is reportedly favored by the Maronite patriarch – whose influence, over an appointment customarily reserved exclusively for Maronites, is not insignificant – and the US ambassador, among others. All analysts with whom NOW spoke agreed, though, that the proposal is unfeasible, given that it would require a two-thirds majority in parliament to make the necessary constitutional amendment; a majority it could not secure in light of March 8’s firm and vocal objection to it. Suleiman himself, moreover, has stated from the beginning that he rejects the extension of his term.

In which case, observers told NOW the likely alternative is a caretaker presidency handled by the cabinet, as per the constitution, until all relevant political factions come to agreement on a successor.

“It is very difficult [to imagine that] a president will be elected before the 25th,” said Hareth Sleiman, a senior member of the independent Democratic Renewal (Tajaddod) Movement. “We are now looking for a candidate on which both axes will agree.”

This prospect has raised concerns that any presidential void could persist for some time, much as the country went without a cabinet for almost 11 months before the current one was formed in February 2014.

“If there’s no election by 25 May, I don’t know if there’ll be one by 25 June, or 25 August,” said Kataeb Party head Amin Gemayel – himself a candidate – on Monday.

There are a number of reasons why this delay could be substantial, according to observers. One argument postulates that the country’s powerbrokers are waiting for the resolution of numerous regional political question-marks, particularly as regards neighboring Syria, where the outcome of the civil war could have momentous consequences on Lebanon. Lebanese presidential terms last six years, which the country’s factions may deem a long time to endure the consequences of any political miscalculations at this stage. Adding to this is the news earlier this week that Saudi Arabia has agreed to enter talks with its longtime foe, Iran. Both countries wield extensive influence over Lebanon’s March 14 and March 8 coalitions, respectively, and any changes in their relationship would likely have corresponding implications for Lebanon.

“[In light of the Saudi-Iran news,] there might [now] be coordination between different external and Arab powers to get a neutral president, like [Central Bank governor] Riad Salameh,” Sleiman told NOW.

Others observers say the delay will also be caused by conflicting interests between Hezbollah and Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement (FPM); nominal March 8 allies who may nonetheless be supporting different candidates. According to March 14 MP Bassem al-Shab, the FPM seeks to elect Aoun himself, while Hezbollah quietly prefers Lebanese Armed Forces commander General Jean Qahwaji, and this divergence is causing both parties to favor a delay.

“If General Aoun is elected president then the other General’s [political] career would end,” Shab told NOW, referring to Qahwaji. “And if the head of the army becomes president, then the career of [Aoun] comes to an end […] I think a lot of people would like to see the deadline pass without a president because that would really favor [Qahwaji].”

There is, in addition to the above scenarios, another alternative, according to a source within the centrist Progressive Socialist Party who spoke to NOW on condition of anonymity: that of Prime Minister Salam’s resignation. While the source deemed it an unlikely event, its likelihood would reportedly increase if excessive pressure were placed upon Salam in his dual role as prime minister and caretaker president. The effects of such a move, should it transpire, could be considerably debilitating, said the source.

“It isn’t exactly a vacuum if we don’t get a president after 25 May, because the cabinet takes over the president’s powers.”

“But if Salam were to resign, then we would have a real vacuum.”

Myra Abdallah contributed reporting.

What now for cabinet formation?

[Originally posted at NOW]

Lebanon’s nine-month-long absence of a government, which briefly looked as though it might come to a resolution earlier this week, now appears set to persist even further following Thursday’s deadly car bombing in Beirut’s southern suburbs, which came just six days after the assassination – also by car bomb – of former minister and ambassador Mohamad Chatah.

Efforts overseen by Prime Minister-designate Tammam Salam to form a cabinet have long been stalled by irreconcilable conditions and counter-conditions imposed by the country’s two key political blocs. The March 8 coalition has demanded a one-third share of ministerial seats to guarantee veto power over any decisions deemed unwelcome, while March 14 has in turn rejected the participation of Hezbollah in the cabinet so long as the party is fighting in neighboring Syria, in contravention of a bipartisan agreement reached in June 2012 to “dissociate” Lebanon from the Syrian conflict.

Nevertheless, Salam and President Michel Suleiman had reportedly decided to form a so-called “fait accompli” cabinet, composed of 14 neutral figures, by 8 January. That proposal has now seemingly been shelved – at least for the moment – in light of Thursday’s attack, with Salam telling one local paper Friday that he was giving parties one more chance to agree on an alternative option. Should they fail to do so, however, a number of sources suggested the fait accompli cabinet could become a reality once again.

“The Dahiyeh bombing definitely slowed down the cabinet formation process,” said an adviser to a current caretaker minister who requested anonymity as he was not authorized to speak to the press. “President Suleiman will now launch new efforts toward a ‘national unity’ government” – the option favored by Hezbollah and the Progressive Socialist Party, among others, under which all major parties would be represented – “to see if there is any change in March 14’s position.”

“But if these efforts fail, Suleiman and Salam will likely go back to the fait accompli option. This could happen as soon as 15 January,” he told NOW.

Other sources, however, suggest the fait accompli proposal will remain inherently unviable for the foreseeable future. For one thing, there are fears it could trigger violent clashes reminiscent of those in May 2008, when March 8-aligned gunmen occupied much of Beirut after deadly gun battles with March 14-affiliated opponents. On several occasions over the past few months, Hezbollah officials and their supporters in the local press have appeared to either imply or directly threaten such an outcome. On Monday, March 8 sources reportedly told the Al-Akhbar newspaper that a fait accompli cabinet would be opposed by Hezbollah “even if it meant storming the Grand Serail,” the seat of the prime minister.

“They are threatening [violence], definitely,” said former MP Mosbah al-Ahdab of the Democratic Renewal (Tajaddod) Movement. Ahdab characterized the March 8 stance to NOW as follows: “Either you accept a cabinet with a blocking third, or a cabinet that they call ‘national unity’ that is impossible to implement... [Otherwise,] we will go down to the streets.”

Another problem with the fait accompli option, according to Future Movement MP Bassem al-Shab, is opposition to it from the Maronite Patriarch, which is of particular significance in light of the ostensibly impending presidential elections.

“Salam and Suleiman are unlikely to go for such a cabinet when the Maronite hierarchy is against it,” Shab told NOW. “If there is a fait accompli cabinet, it means for sure there won’t be presidential elections, because one side will boycott them.”

For that reason, Shab suggested the cabinet formation question may be sidelined until consensus is reached on the next presidential candidate, the election of whom will require a new cabinet in any case, according to the constitution.

“If there’s no government, there may be an incentive to find a common [presidential] candidate which would open the way to a new government. I think it’s going to push all parties to agree on a common candidate.”

Salam seeks small "elections" cabinet

[Originally posted at NOW]

Having concluded two days of high-level consultations with each of Lebanon’s major political parties Wednesday evening, prime minister-designate Tammam Salam now faces the crucial task of appointing the members of his cabinet.

As was already apparent before Salam was formally designated PM Saturday, this process is fraught with difficulty owing to the vastly divergent demands of the country’s opposing March 14 and March 8 coalitions, who continue to disagree even on the basic nature of the cabinet-to-be. Nevertheless, Salam has been forthright about his own vision for the government – which is noticeably, and somewhat controversially, closer to March 14’s than March 8’s – and appears determined to realize it, even threatening to resign if any parties prevent him from doing so.

In brief, March 14 has called for a neutral, non-partisan cabinet, while March 8 demands a partisan “national unity” cabinet representing all parties in proportion to their share of parliament. March 8’s Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) is also specifically seeking to retain control over the energy and telecom ministries; a prospect rejected by March 14’s Future Movement, which advocates a reshuffling of all portfolios.

Salam’s own preferences are markedly closer to March 14’s than March 8’s, whose “national unity” proposal he dismissed on the grounds that such cabinets have failed in the past. Like March 14, Salam advocates a strictly non-partisan and “non-provocative” cabinet whose “central task”would be to oversee the parliamentary elections scheduled for June this year. Accordingly, he also reportedly foresees a smaller cabinet – that is, one with fewer than thirty ministers.

“I’m 100% sure it’s going to be an elections cabinet,” said Democratic Renewal (Tajaddod) Movement secretary-general Antoine Haddad. “And I’m also 100% sure that ministers will not be candidates for the elections,” he told NOW.

As such, Haddad added the cabinet would be as small as is practicable. “My understanding is that it will be of 24 members.”

This was corroborated by a cabinet insider speaking to NOW on condition of anonymity, who added that “Salam expects the cabinet will only last about 6 months.”

Even so, a fierce battle is still expected over the appointments, especially to financially lucrative ministries. As NOW reported Thursday, the energy ministry in particular represents a significant financial opportunity given its control over untapped oil and gas reserves, and it is perhaps no coincidence that the ministry has already become a principal bone of contention between March 14 and Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt on the one hand, and the FPM on the other.

“My sense is that the energy and telecom ministries are the most strategically important,” Haddad told NOW.

The finance ministry has also been singled out, with Future laying claim to it, prompting accusations from the FPM of corrupt intentions.

NOW’s cabinet insider source said such wrangling over portfolios is ultimately driven by financial motives, “especially in an election season, when ministry funds can be diverted for patronage and campaigning purposes.”

Haddad agreed, telling NOW that while it’s also a question of “prerogatives and authority…. the practice under the last government shows that it’s not so innocent. It’s also about financial interest, and using these resources to indirectly finance electoral campaigns, because you can provide services through these things. And this is one more reason why these ministries should be in the hands of those not running for elections.”

Nor is this the only way in which electoral considerations are likely to shape the cabinet – indeed, they appear to permeate the debate at almost all levels, with Salam himself saying the only “obstacles” in his way are “related to the elections themselves.” One hypothesis making the rounds suggests March 8 may have granted concessions to March 14 on the cabinet’s make-up in order to secure concessions from them in turn regarding the longstanding dispute over electoral law – an assessment that Haddad described as “fair.”

If so, the implication is that a cabinet will not be formed until an electoral law is agreed on. How long this will take remains unclear, though Haddad does not expect too lengthy a wait.

“Salam has alluded in several different ways that he doesn’t want to lose momentum on this. I think he won’t take long.”

Tammam Salam: between Future and Miqati

[Originally posted at NOW]

Having reportedly secured the nominations of Future Movement leader Saad Hariri and, crucially, Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) head Walid Jumblatt, Beirut MP Tammam Salam appears to have sufficient backing to become the next prime minister of Lebanon when President Suleiman polls parliamentarians on the matter this weekend. NOW profiles Salam’s historical, political, and personal record.

Born in 1945, the son of six-time Prime Minister Saeb Salam, Tammam hails from a family whose wealth and prestige in the Sunni community date back to Ottoman times. An Arab nationalist who in the 1958 war allied with then-PSP leader Kamal Jumblatt against the pro-Western policies of President Camille Chamoun, Saeb Salam was resentful of his displacement as de facto Sunni chieftain by Rafiq Hariri in the 1990s. Though a reconciliation of sorts later occurred, when Tammam was first elected MP in 1996 his relations with Hariri remained lukewarm, and indeed he ran against him in Beirut in 2000, the same year his father Saeb died.

It was not until Hariri’s 2005 assassination that Salam (who had opposed the emerging campaign against the Syrian occupation) grew closer to the Future Movement, and though he never joined the party, he began thereafter to run on Hariri’s electoral lists; he eventually was appointed minister of culture in Fouad Siniora’s cabinet following the 2008 Doha Agreement. Following that cabinet’s dissolution in 2009, Salam became MP for the Beirut III district, running as an independent on March 14’s list.

Analysts thus summarized him to NOW as a March 14 dove – “between Future and [Caretaker PM Najib] Miqati” – a label further borne out in his somewhat conciliatory attitude toward March 8 magnate Hezbollah. In a leaked US embassy cable from late 2006, then-US ambassador Jeffrey Feltman recalls a meeting with Salam in which he “both defended and criticized” the Party of God, reproaching the US for labeling them “terrorists” and praising their alliance with Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement. Another cable quotes him implying that the party’s arms are legitimate as long as Israel occupies Shebaa Farms.

At the same time, since 2005 he has firmly (if quietly) opposed the Syrian regime, whom he accuses in the same cable of waging a “vendetta” against Lebanon and of posing the greatest risk to the country in general. “He never joined the bandwagon of insulting [Syrian President] Assad,” said one analyst who preferred to remain anonymous. “But he doesn’t hide his March 14 credentials.” More recently, Salam condemned Miqati’s cabinet for politicizing the Syrian refugee issue and failing to “fulfill its humanitarian mission.”

As a person, too, Salam is said to be of moderate temperament – a trait that may prove useful if and when the complex business of forming a cabinet gets underway. “Anyone who knows Tammam either as a public figure or in private knows that he’s a quiet person who approaches problems in a positive manner with a firm will to get a solution rather than complicating the issue,” said Antoine Haddad, secretary-general of the Democratic Renewal (Tajaddod) Movement, an independent party that has previously run on March 14 tickets. “He’s not confrontational, but he also does not surrender on basic principles. So if he is accepted by March 8, he could be a good prime minister for the coming period.”

However, another analyst told NOW he “doubts Hezbollah would endorse” Salam. Were that the case, Salam would secure the nomination only by a slim majority, and face serious difficulties appointing Shiite cabinet ministers. “I don’t see him as someone who is ready to appoint anti-Hezbollah Shiite ministers, it’s not part of his character; he has a moderate, dialogue-prone character.”

Haddad agrees, telling NOW that Salam may try to tailor his cabinet in such a way as to bring Hezbollah on board. “My guess is that he will try to form a government acceptable by more than the majority that has nominated him [i.e. Future and Jumblatt]. I think this is the purpose behind nominating someone like Tammam and not, for example, Saad Hariri. It’s a clever approach to try to rebalance the government without excluding the other parties.”

By the same token, however, should Hezbollah reject him out of hand, his viability as a prime minister would likely prove short-lived.

Jumblatt's jockeying

[Originally posted at NOW]

As the April 5 deadline approaches for President Suleiman’s meeting with parliamentarians to decide the next prime minister, few politicians’ moves are being scrutinized as closely as those of Walid Jumblatt, leader of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and de facto chieftain of the Druze community. Just as Jumblatt’s MPs determine which of the two March 14 and March 8 minorities becomes the majority in parliament, so too will their votes prove decisive on Friday, when a simple poll will grant the premiership to whichever candidate receives the most nominations.

Thus far, neither of the major coalitions has announced a candidate, and in the meantime they are placing fundamentally irreconcilable conditions on the nature of the cabinet overall. March 8 powerhouse Hezbollah has called for a “political” (i.e. partisan) cabinet that affirms the party’s right to bear arms – a demand roundly rejected by March 14, which calls instead for a “neutral” (i.e. non-partisan) cabinet that upholds the Baabda Declaration to “dissociate” Lebanon from Syria; an implicit jab at Hezbollah’s use of its arsenal against the rebels next door.

Nor has Jumblatt named a candidate, though in an intriguing move following a trip by a deputy to Riyadh, he reportedly cut a deal with March 14’s Future Movement leader Saad Hariri to agree to whomever he nominates. Given that Future is expected to coordinate its nomination with March 14 overall, this ostensibly suggests victory for March 14. However, informed PSP sources who spoke to NOW on condition of anonymity interpreted the deal somewhat differently.

“What actually happened was Hariri mentioned four or five names he would support, and Jumblatt will now take those to the other side [i.e. March 8] to see which one is acceptable to them,” said one source. “The candidate which has the best chance at the moment is Tammam Salam,” a former minister of culture under the cabinet of Fuad Siniora.

Conversely, another source told NOW Jumblatt’s offer to Hariri was designed to coerce him into nominating Najib Miqati, the recently resigned PM who, according to some reports, is March 8’s preferred candidate.

“The only person not on board to name Miqati is Hariri,” the source told NOW. “So Jumblatt is trying to pressure Hariri into accepting his nomination.”

“But this puts Hariri in a tough position, because he was ousted from government using Miqati last time,” the source added. “So he’s going to play hard-to-get in order to appeal to the so-called Sunni ‘street’.”

A PSP minister’s spokesperson told NOW that senior party officials were refraining from talking to the press until after Jumblatt’s interview Thursday evening on LBCI’s Kalam Ennas.

Jumblatt has, however, been quite explicit about his preferences for the overall nature of the next cabinet. In a wide-ranging interview Friday, he called for a “national unity” cabinet that would include ministers from all parties across the political spectrum.

He also specifically opposed the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) retaining control of the energy and telecom ministries, referring to the March 8 heavyweight as a “destructive political force”. “[The] FPM will not be handed over the energy and [telecom] ministries […] It’s impossible and will not happen again,” he later told as-Safir. Relations between Jumblatt and FPM leader Michel Aoun have soured after disagreements over electoral law and the extension of security officials’ tenures, reaching new lows over the weekend with mutual accusations of Zionist sympathies.

Other reports suggest Jumblatt also opposes Caretaker Foreign Minister Adnan Mansour taking up any position in the next cabinet.

NOW’S PSP sources ascribed various motives to Jumblatt’s stance on the FPM ministers. “Jumblatt always likes to empower his traditional ally, which is [Parliament Speaker] Nabih Berri. These are lucrative ministries, which neither Jumblatt nor Berri want to go to Aoun,” said one.

“Aoun is too politically contentious,” said another. “Berri, Jumblatt and of course all March 14 parties are against Aoun. So you can’t give these important ministries to Aoun and then say this cabinet is ‘non-political’.”

Dr. Imad Salamey, professor of political science at Lebanese American University, added that with potentially substantial natural gas extraction in the near future, the energy ministry in particular will take on singular importance.

“Big companies are bidding for these gas reserves, this is no joke,” he told NOW. “There’s going to be a lot of money there. So whoever controls the ministry of energy is going to be invested with a lot of political and financial gain. This ministry is going to become very powerful, and obviously Jumblatt is not in favor of Aoun having that power.”

As for Jumblatt’s rejection of Mansour, “even Berri doesn’t want this guy again,” said the PSP source. “He is the puppy of [Syrian ambassador] Ali Abdul Karim Ali.”

Jumblatt’s most important precondition, however, may be one he hasn’t explicitly stated, believes the other PSP source.

“The key ‘red line’ for Jumblatt is what the next electoral law will look like,” he told NOW. “If this law doesn’t give him enough parliamentary seats, he will not go ahead.” Ultimately, continued the source, Jumblatt’s ideal law – “what would really seal the deal” – is the 1960 law, subject to minor amendments.

If Jumblatt can indeed secure a commitment to that law – shunned by March 8 and March 14 parties alike – it will be a testament to the power his “kingmaker” status grants him. In the meantime, March 14 will apparently announce their candidate Thursday evening. Should that name differ from March 8’s nominee, it will fall – once more – on Jumblatt to decide the outcome

Yara Chehayed contributed to this report.